Epistemic beliefs are personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how knowledge is acquired. They influence how individuals evaluate information and evidence.
People with certain epistemic beliefs, such as viewing knowledge as uncertain or relying heavily on intuition, may be more susceptible to conspiracy theories due to increased distrust in expert or scientific knowledge.
Nöth, L., & Zander, L. (2025). How Epistemic Beliefs about Climate Change Predict Climate Change Conspiracy Beliefs. Frontiers in Psychology, 16, 1523143. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1523143
Key Points
- Focus: Investigating how epistemic beliefs (EBs)—beliefs about knowledge and knowing—impact climate change conspiracy theories (CCCT).
- Aims: To identify how specific epistemic beliefs about climate change predict conspiracy beliefs, mediated by distrust in climate science, and explore whether political ideology moderates these relationships.
- Findings: Certain epistemic beliefs (seeing knowledge as uncertain, intuitive, and personally justified) increased belief in CCCT, mediated by distrust in climate science; belief in expert-driven and complex knowledge reduced these conspiracy beliefs.
- Implications: Fostering scientifically informed epistemic beliefs could reduce distrust in science and consequently diminish climate conspiracy theories.
Rationale
Climate conspiracy beliefs hinder the implementation of critical climate policies by promoting skepticism toward climate science.
Previous research identified distrust in scientists as a key predictor of conspiracy beliefs.
Epistemic beliefs—individual beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing—are crucial because they affect how people evaluate scientific claims and contradictory information.
Prior studies have established connections between epistemic beliefs, science trust, and conspiracy ideation.
However, little was known about how these relationships apply specifically to climate change conspiracy beliefs.
Clarifying this relationship can guide educational and communicative interventions aimed at reducing conspiratorial thinking and promoting science trust.
The next step involves experimental testing to establish causality.
Method
The researchers conducted two studies:
- Correlational study (Study 1) using survey data to explore relationships between EBs, distrust in science, CCCT beliefs, and political ideology.
- Experimental study (Study 2) attempting to establish causal relationships by manipulating epistemic beliefs.
Procedure
- Participants gave informed consent.
- Completed questionnaires assessing epistemic beliefs about climate change, distrust in climate science, CCCT, and political ideology.
- In the experimental study, participants read texts promoting either naive or sophisticated epistemic beliefs or no text (control).
Sample
- Study 1: 404 German-speaking participants (211 women, 184 men, 4 others), average age 27.43 years, majority university-educated.
- Study 2: 104 German-speaking Prolific participants (54 women, 50 men), average age 30.46 years, majority university-educated.
Measures
- Epistemic Beliefs (EBs): Custom scale based on Hofer and Pintrich’s model, assessing beliefs on certainty, simplicity, personal knowledge source, expert knowledge source, and subjective justification.
- Distrust in Climate Science: (Dis)Trust in Climate Science Scale (Sarathchandra & Haltinner, 2021).
- Climate Change Conspiracy Beliefs: Six-item scale measuring conspiracy beliefs about climate science.
- Political Ideology: Self-placement scale (left-right).
Statistical measures
- Correlation analyses
- Mediation analyses (PROCESS macro, bootstrapped)
- Moderated mediation analyses, examining political ideology as moderator
Results
- Epistemic beliefs viewing climate knowledge as uncertain, intuitive, and justified by personal observation increased CCCT beliefs.
- Viewing knowledge as complex, interconnected, and based on experts reduced CCCT beliefs.
- Distrust in climate science mediated all significant relationships between epistemic beliefs and CCCT.
- Political ideology moderated only one relationship significantly: The negative link between believing knowledge comes from experts and distrust was stronger among political centrists than left-leaning individuals.
- Experimental manipulation in Study 2 mostly failed, except partially for certainty beliefs, but did replicate the correlational relationships.
Insight
The study reveals that distrust in science strongly mediates the relationship between epistemic beliefs and conspiracy beliefs about climate change.
This is insightful because it suggests educational strategies emphasizing trust in scientific methods could reduce conspiratorial thinking.
The findings extend previous research by clarifying the specific types of epistemic beliefs that lead to conspiracy beliefs about climate change.
Future research should experimentally test how manipulating epistemic beliefs effectively influences conspiracy beliefs and explore how interventions fostering sophisticated epistemic beliefs can strengthen trust in science.
Implications
Practitioners and policymakers can use these findings to improve climate change communication and education. Specifically:
- Promote the idea that climate science knowledge is robust and reliable.
- Challenge intuitive and subjective justifications through science literacy education and critical thinking interventions.
- Enhance understanding of scientific consensus to counteract distrust. Challenges include overcoming pre-existing conspiratorial beliefs and skepticism towards educational interventions among skeptics.
Strengths
This study had several methodological strengths, including:
- Robust correlational analysis clarifying mediators (science trust) and moderators (political ideology).
- Clear, theoretically grounded approach to epistemic beliefs, linking multiple dimensions of beliefs to conspiracy ideation.
- Consistency and replication of correlational findings across two studies, increasing confidence in conclusions.
Limitations
This study also had several limitations, including:
- Correlational nature of Study 1 cannot establish causation.
- Experimental manipulation in Study 2 largely unsuccessful, limiting causal inference.
- Limited ideological diversity in the sample (mostly centrist or left-leaning), potentially underestimating political moderation effects.
- Reliability concerns with the custom epistemic beliefs scale, possibly weakening observed relationships.
Socratic Questions
- How might the cultural context influence the relationship between epistemic beliefs and climate conspiracy beliefs?
- Why do you think intuitive or subjective justifications for knowledge are attractive despite contradictory scientific evidence?
- What alternative explanations might exist for the observed relationship between epistemic beliefs and conspiracy beliefs?
- How could future studies more effectively test the causal relationship between epistemic beliefs and conspiracy theories?
- How might increasing trust in science among climate skeptics affect broader societal attitudes toward science?
- If you were to design an educational intervention based on this research, what elements would be essential, and why?
- Can fostering sophisticated epistemic beliefs unintentionally create over-reliance on authority figures? How might that risk be mitigated?
