Jean Piaget argued that it is the reasoning underlying a behaviour, rather than the moral behaviour itself, that determines whether it is right or wrong.
He argued that morality is not a set of learned rules but a structural transformation of how children process social interactions.
This shift moves from a rigid adherence to authority toward a flexible understanding of mutual respect and cooperation.
Piaget found that children’s ideas regarding rules, moral judgments, and punishment tended to change as they got older.
In other words just as there were stages to children’s cognitive development so there were also universal stages to their moral development.
Piaget (1932) suggested two main types of moral thinking:
- Heteronomous morality: rules as unchangeable and imposed by authorities (moral realism)
- Autonomous morality: rules are created by people and can be negotiated (moral relativism)
Heteronomous Morality (5-9 yrs)
Young children typically exhibit a heteronomous moral orientation, meaning they are subject to another’s laws or rules.
During this phase, morality is heavily influenced by authority figures, and children view rules as external, sacred, and unchangeable laws.
This orientation is characterised by unilateral respect, meaning children show unconditional obedience to parents and other adults.
Children at this level judge responsibility objectively and externally, and their moral beliefs include:
- Expiatory punishment: The belief that one must simply pay the penalty for a misdeed.
- Moral realism: The acceptance of punishment simply because it is handed down by an authority figure.
- Collective punishment: The belief that it is acceptable to punish a whole group (like an entire class) for the misdeed of a single child.
- Immanent justice: The belief that a later mishap or misfortune is an automatic punishment for an earlier misdeed that went unpunished.
Behavior is judged as “bad” in terms of the observable consequences, regardless of the intentions or reasons for that behavior.
Therefore, a large amount of accidental damage is viewed as worse than a small amount of deliberate damage.
Punishment & Justice
Because young children view rules as absolute, their concepts of justice are closely tied to authority.
They believe in moral realism, meaning they accept a punishment simply because an authority figure has handed it down.
They endorse expiatory punishment, which is the belief that one must simply pay a penalty for a misdeed.
Children accept collective punishment, such as punishing an entire class for the misdeed of a single child.
They believe in immanent justice, which is the assumption that a later, unrelated mishap is an automatic punishment for an earlier misdeed that went unpunished
Autonomous Morality (9-10 yrs)
As children mature, their moral compass becomes “subject to one’s own laws or rules”.
They begin to view rules not as unchangeable edicts, but as the products of social agreements, leading to what Piaget called the morality of cooperation.
This shift is accompanied by a transition toward mutual respect within their peer group, where disagreements between equals must be negotiated and resolved rather than dictated by an adult
Older children shift toward an internal responsibility.
They begin to understand that it is the reasoning and intentions underlying a behaviour, rather than just the physical outcome or behaviour itself, that ultimately determines whether an action is right or wrong
They develop an internal sense of responsibility and shift their beliefs toward:
- The principle of reciprocity: Focusing on making good the loss or damage caused by an action.
- Moral relativism: Understanding that justice is not strictly tied to authority.
At this stage, children also abandon their beliefs in collective punishment and immanent justice.
Mechanism of Moral Development
Piaget believed that around the age of 9-10 children’s understanding of moral issues underwent a fundamental reorganisation.
By now they are beginning to overcome the egocentrism of middle childhood and have developed the ability to see moral rules from other people’s point of view.
A child who can decentre to take other people’s intentions and circumstances into account can move to making the more independent moral judgments of the second stage.
As a result children’s ideas on the nature of rules themselves, on moral responsibility, punishment and justice, all change, and their thinking becomes more like that of adults.
The reference group for children’s moral beliefs is increasingly focused on other children and disputes between equals need to be negotiated and compromises made.
Rules
Children now understand that rules do not come from some mystical “divine-like” source. People make rules and people can change them – they are not inscribed on tablets of stone.
With regard to the “rules of the game” older children recognize that rules are needed to prevent quarreling and to ensure fair play.
Indeed sometimes they even become quite fascinated with the whole issue and will for example discuss the rules of board games (like chess, Monopoly, cards) or sport (the off-side rule) with all the interest of a lawyer.
They also recognize that rules can be changed if circumstances dictate (e.g. “You’ve got one player less so we will give you a three goal start”) and if everybody agrees.
Moral Responsibility
With regard to issues of blame and moral responsibility older children don’t just take the consequences into account they also consider motives.
Children begin to realize that if they behave in ways that appear to be wrong, but have good intentions, they are not necessarily going to be punished.
Thus, for them a well-intentioned act that turned out badly is less blameworthy than a malicious act that did no harm.
Lying
Children’s views on lying also change.
The seriousness of a lie is judged in terms of betrayal of trust. They now recognize that all lies are not the same and, for example, you might tell a “white lie” in order to spare someone’s feelings.
They also recognize that if someone says something that they know not to be the case this doesn’t necessarily mean the other person is telling a lie.
It could be that they made a mistake or that this is a difference of opinion.
Overall lying is now considered wrong not because you get punished for it by adults (the younger children’s view) but because it is a betrayal of trust and undermines friendship and co-operation.
Punishment & Justice
With regard to punishment the emphasis now moves from retribution to restitution.
It’s purpose is not primarily to make the guilty suffer but to put things right again.
Punishment should be aimed at helping the offender understand the harm (s)he has caused so that (s)he will not be motivated to repeat the offence and, wherever possible, punishment should fit the crime – say for example when a vandal is required to make good the damage (s)he has caused.
Older children also recognise that justice in real life is an imperfect system.
Sometimes the guilty get away with their crimes and sometimes the innocent suffer unfairly. For younger children collective punishment is seen as acceptable.
For example, they would not disagree with a whole class being punished for the misdeeds of a single child. For the older children it is always considered wrong to punish the innocent for the misdeeds of the guilty.
Peer Interactions
How do peer interactions act as a catalyst for moral development?
Peer interaction serves as the primary mechanism for transitioning children from blind obedience to autonomous moral reasoning.
This shift occurs because peer relationships lack the inherent power imbalance found in adult-child dynamics.
While adults provide safety and structure, they often inadvertently stifle moral negotiation by imposing pre-established rules.
In contrast, peers must actively co-construct their own ethical frameworks through constant social exchange.
Peer interactions act as a catalyst for moral development by providing a unique social environment where children are forced to navigate disagreements, practice empathy, and construct shared rules on an equal footing.
From Unilateral to Mutual Respect
Young children initially operate under unilateral respect, which is the tendency to follow rules solely because they are issued by an authority figure.
This mindset views morality as a set of external, sacred dictates that must never change.
Adults are simply too intellectually and socially distant to foster a sense of shared rule-making.
Consequently, the child remains a passive recipient of moral instruction rather than an active participant.
Conversely, mutual respect emerges when children recognize others as their social equals. This horizontal relationship structure replaces the vertical hierarchy of the home or classroom.
Because no single child holds absolute power, the group must agree on rules to maintain social harmony.
This transition marks the beginning of moral autonomy, defined as the ability to make ethical decisions based on internal logic rather than external fear.
Sociological Conflict and Cooperative Negotiation
Peer interactions inevitably produce sociological conflict, or the clash of differing viewpoints between individuals of similar status.
These disagreements are essential because they force children to defend their own logic while considering the logic of others.
Unlike interactions with parents, peer conflicts cannot be resolved by one party simply “pulling rank.” Children must instead employ practical strategies like bargaining, turn-taking, and compromise.
Successful cooperation requires the mutual coordination of goals, where participants align their individual desires with the needs of the group.
If a child refuses to negotiate, the play session usually ends in failure. This social pressure creates a functional necessity for fairness.
Through this process, children learn that rules are not divine laws but are flexible tools for social organization.
Overcoming Egocentrism via Perspective-Taking
The friction of social disagreement is the most effective tool for dismantling childhood egocentrism.
This is the cognitive inability to distinguish between one’s own perspective and the perspective of others.
When a peer presents a conflicting idea, the child experiences cognitive dissonance, an uncomfortable mental state caused by holding two contradictory beliefs.
To resolve this tension, the child must evaluate the validity of the competing viewpoint.
This evaluation fosters perspective-taking, which is the capacity to mentally represent the internal states of another person.
By comparing their own intentions with those of their peers, children develop a more sophisticated understanding of justice.
They stop focusing purely on the physical consequences of an action. Instead, they begin to weigh the intentions and feelings of the people involved.
Empirical Validation: The Damon and Killen Study (1982)
The hypothesis that peer discussion facilitates faster moral advancement was tested in a landmark laboratory study.
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Aim: Researchers sought to determine if peer discussions about justice led to greater moral growth than discussions with adults.
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Procedure: Children were presented with a series of ethical dilemmas involving the fair distribution of resources. Participants were assigned to either a peer-led discussion group or a session led by an adult experimenter. Pre-test and post-test interviews were conducted to measure the complexity of each child’s moral reasoning.
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Findings: Children in the peer-led groups demonstrated significant upward shifts in their moral reasoning levels. Those who interacted with adults tended to remain at their baseline level or simply echoed the adult’s suggestions.
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Conclusions: Peer interaction acts as a unique catalyst for development because it encourages critical evaluation rather than passive acceptance. The symmetry of the peer relationship allows for a deeper cognitive restructuring of moral concepts.
Critical Evaluation
Piaget’s theory of children’s moral development can be seen as an application of his ideas on cognitive development generally. As such his theory here has both the strengths and weaknesses of his overall theory.
1. Reliability
Piaget uses qualitative methods (observation and clinical interviews). His research is based on very small samples. His methods are not standardised and therefore not replicable.
It is impossible to say from his research how generalizable the results are. His is exploratory research, which is useful for generating new ideas rather than for the rigorous testing of hypotheses.
2. Validity
Is Piaget testing what he thinks he is testing? This isn’t clear. For example in his story of the broken cups Piaget claims to find a difference in children’s views of what is right or fair.
However, it may be that the answer the children give is based on their view of what would actually happen in such circumstances not what they think should happen.
3. Underestimating children’s rate of development
Piaget argues that the shift from “moral realism” to “moral relativism” occurs around the age of 9 to 10 and that children younger than this do not take motives into account when judging how much someone is to blame.
Other research suggests that children develop an understanding of the significance of subjective facts at a much earlier age. Nelson (1980) found that even 3-year olds could distinguish intentions from consequences if the story was made simple enough.
4. What do children’s replies to a story actually mean?
This, again isn’t necessarily clear. Do they understand the story? Are they able to remember it correctly? Do they give the answer that they think will please the experimenter? Is their reply governed by the substantive aspects of the story (what actually happens) or by the moral principle embedded in it?
5. Does Piaget tell us what we want to know?
Piaget’s research is about children’s moral reasoning. Many psychologists argue that what is far more important is not what children think about moral issues but how they actually behave.
And we should not forget that there is no one-to-one relationship between attitudes and behavior. La Pierre (1934) proved that in his research with the Chinese couple driving around America.
6. Piaget vs Kohlberg
Kohlberg’s theory focuses on the description of moral thought as a progression through stages leading to the discovery of universal moral principles, particularly justice.
In contrast, Piaget’s constructivist theory emphasizes the individual’s active construction of moral understanding through interactions with the social world.
This difference leads to varying views on universality, autonomy, and the relationship between thought and action.
| Feature | Piaget | Kohlberg |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Theory | Constructivist: Moral structures are individually constructed through interaction with the social world. | Initially constructivist, but shifts towards a more universalist and rationalist approach. |
| Universality | Universality is achieved through logical and scientific processes, driven by the true nature of man. This leads to universal forms of moral reasoning, not necessarily specific moral content. | Proposes a universal sequence of moral development leading to universal moral principles, primarily “justice”. This clashes with the idea of individual construction of moral structures. |
| Moral Autonomy | Autonomy is the independent unfolding of moral concepts constructed through the interplay of action and thought. | Focuses on the description of moral development toward universal principles. Autonomy might be understood as independence from other moral principles or content. |
| Methodology | Studies the process of moral concept formation through action and thought. Uses methods like the marble game and stories focused on social concepts like “intention” and “equality”. | Utilizes hypothetical stories to create cognitive conflict and study the reasoning behind subjects’ responses. The focus is on moral reasoning rather than action. |
| Thought-Action Problem | Integrates action and thought as part of the same process, mitigating the thought-action problem. | Criticized for the disconnect between moral reasoning and action. Attempts to address this through concepts like ego strength and types of moral judgment, but the focus remains on following principles rather than knowledge production. |
| Moral Education | Believes instruction can accelerate development towards moral autonomy. | Early work focused on stage advancement through cognitive conflict. Later work, particularly in “just communities”, emphasizes community moral atmosphere, equality, cooperation, and the role of an instructor/collaborator. |
| Goal of Moral Education | Development towards “justice” understood as equality and independence. | Stage development of moral thinking towards the discovery of the principle of “justice” as a high, abstract, universal, and rational principle. |
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is often seen as an extension of Piaget’s theory, but they have key differences.
While both theories are considered constructivist, they differ in their approach to universality.
Kohlberg’s theory suggests a universal sequence of moral development leading to universal moral principles, primarily the principle of “justice”.
This clashes with constructivism, which argues that moral structures are individually constructed through interaction with the social world.
If social conditions and relations vary across cultures, so would moral reasoning, making universal principles unlikely.
Piaget, on the other hand, proposes a universality based on logical and scientific processes.
He believed that the true nature of man drives the adoption of these processes, leading to a universal form of moral reasoning rather than specific moral content.
Another difference lies in their approach to moral autonomy.
Piaget sees autonomy as the independent unfolding of moral concepts constructed through the interplay of action and thought.
Kohlberg focuses on describing the characteristics of moral development toward universal principles.
This suggests that autonomy for Kohlberg might mean independence from other moral principles or content, rather than a process of construction.
This theoretical divergence leads to different methodologies.
Piaget, focused on the formation of moral concepts through action and thought, used methods like the marble game and stories centered on social concepts like “intention” and “equality”.
Kohlberg, interested in describing the characteristics of moral development, utilized hypothetical stories to create cognitive conflict in subjects.
The focus remained on the subjects’ reasoning rather than their actions.
Piaget’s Research Methods
To formulate his theory, Piaget used two primary methods:
- Observing Games: Piaget observed children playing the game of marbles. He believed that all morality consists of a system of rules, and because marbles is a game where children create and enforce their own complex code of laws free from adult influence, it was a perfect lens to study how moral knowledge develops.
- Hypothetical Stories: Piaget presented children with pairs of stories about hypothetical children who had lied, stolen, or broken something. When asking the children to judge the characters, Piaget was far more interested in the reasons the children gave for their answers than in the answers themselves.
Piaget (1932) was principally interested not in what children do (i.e., in whether they break the rules or not) but in what they think. In other words, he was interested in children’s moral reasoning.
Jean Piaget was interested in three main aspects of children’s understanding of moral issues.
Children’s understanding of rules. This leads to questions like
- Where do rules come from?
- Can rules be changed?
- Who makes rules?
Children’s understanding of moral responsibility. This leads to questions like
- Who is to blame for “bad” things?
- Is it the outcome of behavior that makes an action “bad”?
- Is there a difference between accidental and deliberate wrongdoing?
Children’s understanding of justice. This leads to questions like
- Should the punishment fit the crime?
- Are the guilty always punished?
Research Findings
Piaget (1932) told the children stories that embodied a moral theme and then asked for their opinion. Here are two examples:
There was once a little girl who was called Marie. She wanted to surprise her mother and cut out a piece of sewing for her. But she didn’t know how to use the scissors properly and cut a big hole in her dress.
and
A little girl called Margaret went and took her mother’s scissors one day when her mother was out. She played with them for a bit. Then, as she didn’t know how to use them properly, she made a little hole in her dress.
The child is then asked, “Who is naughtier?”
Typically younger children (pre-operational and early concrete operational i.e. up to age 9-10) say that Marie is the naughtier child.
Although they recognize the distinction between a well-intentioned act that turns out badly and a careless, thoughtless, or malicious act, they tend to judge naughtiness in terms of the severity of the consequence rather than in terms of motives. This is what Piaget means by moral realism.
Piaget was also interested in what children understand by a lie. Here he found that the seriousness of a lie is measured by younger children in terms of the size of the departure from the truth.
So a child who said he saw a dog the size of an elephant would be judged to have told a worse lie than a child who said he saw a dog the size of a horse even though the first child is less likely to be believed.
With regard to punishment, Piaget also found that young children also had a characteristic view. Firstly, they saw the function of punishment as make the guilty suffer.
Paint called this retributive justice (or expiatory punishment) because punishment is seen as an act of retribution or revenge.
If you, like young children, have a very Old Testament view of punishment (“an eye for an eye”). Punishment is seen as a deterrent to further wrongdoing, and the stricter it is, the more effective they imagine it will be.
They also believe in what Piaget called immanent justice (that punishment should automatically follow bad behavior).
For example, one story he told was of two children who robbed the local farmer’s orchard (today, we might take the example of children who robbed cars).
The farmer saw the children and tried to catch them. One was caught, and the farmer gave him a thrashing. The other, who could run faster, got away.
However, on the way home, this child had to cross the stream on a very slippery log. This child fell off the log and cut his leg badly.
Now when you ask younger children why the boy cut his leg they don’t say, “because the log was slippery,” they say, “because he stole from the farmer”.
In other words, young children interpret misfortune as if it were some kind of punishment from God or from some kind of superiour force.
For young children, justice is seen as in the nature of things. The guilty in their view are always punished (in the long run) and the natural world is like a policeman.
Piaget (1932) described the morality described above as heteronomous morality. This means a morality that is formed out of being subject to another’s rules.
Of course, for young children, these are the rules that adults impose upon them. It is thus a morality that comes from unilateral respect. That is to say the respect children owe to their parents, teachers and others.
However, as children get older the circumstances of their lives change and their whole attitude to moral questions undergoes a radical change. An example of this is how children respond to a question about the wrongdoing of a member of their peer group.
Young children typically “tell” on others. They believe their primary obligation is to tell the truth to an adult when asked to do so.
Older children typically believe that their first loyalty is to their friends and you don’t “grass” on your mates. This would be one example of the two moralities of the child.
References
Damon, W., & Killen, M. (1982). Peer interaction and the process of change in children’s moral reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 28(3), 347-367.
Kavathatzopoulos, I. (1991). Kohlberg and Piaget: Differences and similarities. Journal of Moral Education, 20(1), 47-54.
LaPiere, R. T. (1934). Attitudes vs. actions. Social forces, 13(2), 230-237
Nelson, S. A. (1980). Factors influencing young children’s use of motives and outcomes as moral criteria. Child Development, 823-829.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
