Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is the mental discomfort experienced when a person holds two conflicting beliefs or when their actions don’t align with their beliefs.

To reduce this uncomfortable feeling, people often change their thoughts, behavior, or attitudes to make everything feel more consistent.

For example, when people smoke (behavior) and they know that smoking causes cancer (cognition), they are in a state of cognitive dissonance.

Cognitive Dissonance Smoking Example
Cognitive dissonance happens when what we believe clashes with how we act. For example, valuing healthy living while smoking creates inner tension. That tension pushes us to change our behavior, adjust our beliefs, or find a way to justify the gap.

Key Takeaways

  • Cognitive Clash: Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort of holding two conflicting beliefs, or acting against a belief. It pushes people to restore consistency.
  • Magnitude: How much discomfort you feel depends on how important the clashing beliefs are and how many dissonant cognitions you hold relative to consonant ones.
  • Four Main Fixes: People typically change their behaviour, reject or downplay the conflicting belief, add new supportive beliefs, or decide the conflict simply doesn’t matter that much.
  • Less-Leads-to-More: Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) classic experiment found that a $1 reward for lying produced more attitude change than a $20 one. The small payment left no easy excuse for lying.
  • Individual Differences: Highly anxious people tend to show stronger dissonance effects, while others tolerate inconsistency without much discomfort. The classic paradigms also rely heavily on small student samples.
  • Modern Evidence: Brain-imaging studies now link dissonance to real arousal in the brain. A 2019 meta-analysis of over 7,800 participants confirms that deliberately triggered dissonance produces robust, real-world behaviour change.
  • Verdict: Mixed or contested. Writing against one’s own view shifts attitudes, but a large preregistered replication did not confirm that this depends on free choice.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Festinger’s Theory: Dissonance as a Drive State

Festinger (1957) described dissonance as a negative drive state, like hunger or thirst. Hunger motivates eating. Dissonance motivates people to restore consistency. It also makes them avoid situations and information likely to raise the tension.

Festinger defined cognitions as “the things a person knows about himself, about his behaviour and about his surroundings.” That covers beliefs, attitudes, values, and knowledge of one’s own actions. Any two cognitions can relate in one of three ways:

  • Consonant: One cognition follows from or fits the other, so they are consistent.
  • Dissonant: The opposite of one cognition follows from the other, so they clash.
  • Irrelevant: The two cognitions have no bearing on each other.

“I smoke” and “smoking causes cancer” are dissonant, assuming the person does not want cancer. Festinger’s central claim was that attitude change is a major way of reducing dissonance.

The theory belongs to a family of cognitive consistency theories. These include Heider’s balance theory and Osgood and Tannenbaum’s congruity theory. All assume that inconsistency is aversive and drives change toward coherence.

The Doomsday Cult Study: When Prophecy Fails

Leon Festinger first studied cognitive dissonance in a doomsday cult. He used covert participant observation, and published the study with Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter as When Prophecy Fails (1956).

The cult’s leader prophesied that a great flood would destroy the Earth on a set date. The believers, known as the Seekers, expected a flying saucer to rescue them at midnight.

The study asked what happened next. It focused on the most committed members.

The date came and went. No flood arrived.

These believers had given up their homes and jobs to join the cult, and they now faced a prophecy that had failed.

Less committed members had less at stake. They quietly drifted away.

The most devoted members, by contrast, did not conclude they had been wrong. They claimed their faith had saved the world from destruction, which reinforced their original conviction.

For the first time, they also began energetically recruiting new believers. The converts supplied social support that outweighed the disconfirming evidence.

Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956) specified five conditions under which disconfirmation should intensify a belief rather than destroy it:

  • Deep conviction: The belief is held strongly and is relevant to action.
  • Costly commitment: The believer has taken steps that are hard to undo, such as giving up jobs, homes or possessions.
  • Specific prediction: The belief is precise enough to be clearly refuted by real events.
  • Undeniable evidence: The disconfirming evidence occurs, and the believer recognises it.
  • Group support: Fellow believers are there to sustain one another.

When all five hold, an isolated believer would buckle. A group member cannot recant without unbearable dissonance. So they reduce it by winning new converts.

How Attitude Change Takes Place

Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory says we want our attitudes and actions to match and feel comfortable inside. This is called cognitive consistency.

When our attitudes and actions don’t agree (called dissonance), we feel uncomfortable and try to fix it by changing something.

The theory doesn’t say these fixes always work, just that people try to reduce their discomfort.

Several factors shape how people change their attitudes.

The Magnitude of Dissonance

Festinger (1957) argued that dissonance is a matter of degree, not all-or-nothing. Three factors determine how much pressure a person feels to resolve it.

  • Importance: The more personally significant the clashing beliefs, the stronger the dissonance. A trivial mismatch, like a preferred pen brand, barely registers.
  • Ratio: Dissonance depends on the proportion of dissonant to consonant cognitions, not just their number. A smoker with many supporting beliefs feels less pressure than one with few.
  • Number: The total count of dissonant cognitions adds to the overall discomfort, up to the point where changing a belief becomes the easier option.

Sakai (1999) later proposed a multiplicative model treating dissonance as roughly the product of importance and proportion, giving Festinger’s original rule a mathematical form.

Recognizing Cognitive Dissonance in Your Own Life

You can recognize cognitive dissonance through feelings of unease, stress, or anxiety. These often follow an action that conflicts with your beliefs or values.

For example, you might act in a way that doesn’t match what you believe is right. Afterward, you may feel guilt or emotional discomfort.

You may also catch yourself trying to justify or rationalize your actions to reduce this inner tension.

Common signs include:

  • Second-guessing decisions
  • Avoiding certain situations
  • Feeling mentally conflicted about your choices or beliefs

Noticing these feelings is the first step toward understanding and managing cognitive dissonance.

Examples of Cognitive Dissonance

These well-known fictional characters each show cognitive dissonance in action.

CharacterThe clashHow they reduce it
Eleven (Stranger Things)Wants a normal life but feels responsible for using her powers to protect friendsFocuses on her role as protector and the bonds she has formed
Rue (Euphoria)Her drug use conflicts with her wish to recoverRationalizes it: it helps her cope with trauma, and she can quit “anytime”
Cady Heron (Mean Girls)Values kindness and honesty but adopts manipulative behaviorsSees manipulation as a necessary strategy for surviving high school
Truman (The Truman Show)Believes his reality is genuine but notices signs it is artificialSeeks the truth until he breaks free of the staged world
Walter White (Breaking Bad)Sees himself as a good person but commits illegal, harmful actsRationalizes them as necessary sacrifices for his family
Michael Scott (The Office)Wants to be a great boss but behaves insensitivelyBlames outside factors and calls his behavior his way of showing care

1. Stranger Things – Eleven’s Identity Conflict

Eleven is a young girl with extraordinary psychic powers, but she also feels vulnerable and isolated because of her traumatic experiences in a secret lab.

Throughout the series, she struggles with a central tension. She wants to live a normal, peaceful life like other kids, yet her dangerous abilities keep putting her and her friends in harm’s way.

This conflict creates cognitive dissonance. Eleven wants to be a regular kid, but she also feels responsible for using her powers to protect her friends and fight threats.

To reduce this discomfort, she justifies risking her safety. She focuses on the importance of her role as a protector and the deep bonds she has formed.

This justification helps her reconcile the clash between her desire for normalcy and the extraordinary demands placed on her.

2. Euphoria – Rue’s Addiction vs. Recovery

Rue is a teenager battling drug addiction while simultaneously wanting to get clean and build a healthier life.

She experiences intense cognitive dissonance because her behavior (using drugs) conflicts with her belief and desire to recover.

This internal conflict produces feelings of guilt, shame, and anxiety.

To manage her emotional pain, Rue often rationalizes her drug use. She tells herself it helps her cope with trauma. She also insists she can quit “anytime.”

These justifications provide temporary relief from the mental discomfort but ultimately perpetuate the cycle of addiction.

Her struggle vividly illustrates how cognitive dissonance can maintain harmful habits by driving self-justifying thought patterns that prevent genuine behavior change.


3. Mean Girls – Cady Heron’s Social Conflict

Cady Heron starts high school valuing kindness, honesty, and being true to herself.

However, as she becomes part of the popular clique called the “Plastics,” she gradually adopts manipulative and deceptive behaviors that conflict with her original values.

This clash creates cognitive dissonance: an uncomfortable conflict between who she believes she is and how she is acting.

To ease this discomfort, Cady justifies her manipulative actions. She sees them as a necessary strategy for navigating the ruthless social hierarchy of high school.

She convinces herself that bending her values is essential for survival and acceptance, which allows her to reconcile the conflict without fully abandoning her self-image.


4. The Truman Show – Truman’s Reality Conflict

Truman Burbank lives an apparently perfect, idyllic life. Gradually, though, he starts noticing strange inconsistencies: people acting oddly, events repeating, and the world feeling artificial.

His deep-seated belief that his reality is genuine clashes with these growing signs. His entire life, it turns out, is a staged TV show, creating intense cognitive dissonance.

The illusion cracks. This internal conflict causes Truman discomfort and confusion, driving him to question everything he knows.

Motivated by this tension, he actively seeks the truth, pushing past the boundaries of his controlled environment.

Ultimately, his determination to resolve the dissonance leads him to break free from the fabricated world. He reclaims his autonomy.


5. Breaking Bad – Walter White: Family vs. Crime

Walter starts as a mild-mannered chemistry teacher who values family and integrity. After his cancer diagnosis, he begins manufacturing methamphetamine to secure his family’s financial future.

The stakes rise fast. He faces dissonance between his self-image as a good person and his illegal, harmful actions.

As Walter continues down this path, he copes with the internal conflict by rationalizing his actions as necessary sacrifices for his family.

He calls it protecting the people he loves. He convinces himself that breaking the law is justified because it secures his loved ones’ financial security. This belief lets him maintain a sense of moral purpose despite his harmful behavior.


6. The Office – Michael Scott’s Leadership Dissonance

Michael Scott frequently expresses that he cares deeply about his employees and wants to be a great boss.

However, his actions often contradict this self-perception. He can be insensitive, inappropriate, or self-centered, which sometimes harms his relationships at work.

This inconsistency between how he sees himself and how he actually behaves creates cognitive dissonance.

To reduce this uncomfortable conflict, Michael rationalizes his mistakes. He blames outside factors instead of admitting fault.

He tells himself his unconventional behavior is just his unique way of showing care. This helps him maintain a positive self-image despite his problematic actions.

What causes cognitive dissonance?

Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable feeling you get when your beliefs or actions don’t match.

This mental tension motivates you to change your thoughts or behaviors. You may also look for reasons to justify the difference, so you feel more consistent inside.

Three classic situations reliably arouse it:

  • Forced compliance: Being pressured to act against your true beliefs.
  • Effort justification: Putting great effort into something disappointing or unpleasant.
  • Decision making: Choosing between attractive options that each have positives and negatives.

1. Forced Compliance Behavior

Forced compliance behavior happens when someone is pressured to do something that goes against their true beliefs or feelings.

This creates a conflict inside because their actions don’t match what they really think.

How it works:

Since the behavior is already done and can’t be changed, the individual often reduces dissonance by changing their attitude toward the behavior.

They might convince themselves that what they did wasn’t so bad or even that they actually agreed with it all along.

Classic Study – Festinger and Carlsmith (1959):

  • Aim: To test whether a small reward produces more attitude change than a large one, against the common-sense prediction that bigger rewards work better.
  • Method: Seventy-one male students completed an hour of dull, repetitive tasks, such as turning pegs on a board. Afterwards, they were paid either $1 or $20 to tell a waiting student that the tasks had been interesting.
  • Results: On a scale from −5 to +5, the $1 group rated the tasks at +1.35 on average. This compared with −0.05 for the $20 group and −0.45 for a control group who never lied.
  • Conclusion: A small reward, not a large one, produced more attitude change. This “less-leads-to-more” effect confirmed dissonance theory’s prediction and overturned the common-sense view that bigger rewards work better.

The two payment groups reasoned differently:

  • $1 group: Insufficient external justification (no good outside reason for lying) created strong dissonance, so participants changed their attitude and rated the boring tasks as enjoyable.
  • $20 group: The large payment gave sufficient external justification, so participants felt little dissonance and kept their original negative view of the tasks.

Related Findings: Mild Threats and Over-Justification

Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) found the same logic in children. Children were told not to play with an attractive toy, under either a mild or a severe threat.

Those who obeyed the mild threat felt more dissonance, because a weak deterrent is harder to justify. They devalued the toy more, and for longer (Freedman, 1965).

The mirror image is the over-justification effect. It occurs when an unneeded reward for an enjoyable activity undermines the original interest. Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (1973) tested it on nursery children. They promised the children a “good-player” award for drawing with felt-tip pens, an activity they already enjoyed.

These children later played with the pens less than children rewarded unexpectedly or not at all. The salient reward supplied an external justification that crowded out their original intrinsic motivation.

Too little justification pushes people to internalise a counter-attitudinal act. Too much can undermine interest they already had.


2. Effort Justification

Effort justification occurs when people put a lot of time, energy, or effort into something disappointing or unpleasant.

To avoid the discomfort of feeling their effort was wasted, they convince themselves the outcome was worthwhile.

Why it happens:

If we spend a great deal of effort on something and then evaluate it negatively, this creates dissonance.

To reduce this, we reshape our perception, emphasizing positive aspects or finding new value in the experience.

Classic Study – Aronson and Mills (1959):

  • Aim: To test whether a more severe initiation into a group increases how much a person later comes to like that group.
  • Method: Sixty-three female college students volunteered for what they believed was a group discussion on the psychology of sex. They were assigned to a control, mild-embarrassment or severe-embarrassment initiation (described below).
  • Results: All participants rated how interesting and valuable the same deliberately dull taped discussion about sex in animals was. The severe-embarrassment group rated it far more positively than the mild or control groups did.
  • Conclusion: Greater effort or discomfort during initiation increases how much a person values the group afterwards. Inflating the group’s worth resolves the dissonance of having suffered for it.

The three initiation groups were:

  • Control group: Joined with no initiation at all.
  • Mild-embarrassment group: First read aloud milder words, such as “prostitute” and “virgin.”
  • Severe-embarrassment group: First read aloud obscene words and explicit sexual passages to a male experimenter.

3. Decision Making

Making a decision between two or more attractive options often creates dissonance because each choice has both positive and negative aspects.

Why dissonance occurs:

After making a choice, people feel uneasy about the benefits they gave up from the other options.

To reduce this discomfort, they focus on the positives of their choice and downplay the negatives, helping them feel confident and satisfied with their decision.

This process is known as spreading of alternatives.

Classic Study – Brehm (1956):

  • Aim: To test whether choosing between similarly attractive options changes how much people like each option afterwards.
  • Method: Female participants rated household appliances on an eight-point scale, then chose one of two items to keep. The items were ½ to 1½ points apart (a hard choice) or three points apart (an easy choice).
  • Results: After the hard choice, participants liked the chosen item more and the rejected item less. This is post-decisional spreading of the alternatives.
  • Conclusion: Harder decisions arouse more dissonance. People reduce it by stressing the chosen option’s strengths and the rejected option’s weaknesses.

Field Study – Knox and Inkster (1968):

  • Aim: To test whether post-decisional dissonance appears after a real, irrevocable choice outside the laboratory.
  • Method: Researchers approached bettors at a racetrack, either queuing to place a $2 bet or just after placing it. All were asked how confident they were that their horse would win.
  • Results: Bettors who had already placed the bet were markedly more confident, although nothing about the horses’ chances had changed.
  • Conclusion: The bet made the decision irrevocable. Dissonance could then be reduced only by becoming more certain of the choice, so bettors inflated their horse’s chances.

The study’s strength is high ecological validity: real gamblers, real money and a consequential choice. Its limitation is that the two groups were different people sampled at different moments, so it lacks random assignment.

Dissonance theory also predicts selective exposure. After a decision, people seek out information that fits their choice and avoid information that would reopen the conflict.

The evidence is stronger for two related processes. Selective attention means dwelling on consistent information already present. Selective interpretation means reading ambiguous information as consistent with existing beliefs.


Additional Causes of Cognitive Dissonance

Three further situations commonly trigger dissonance:

  • Contradictory beliefs: Holding opposing beliefs simultaneously (e.g., believing in honesty but telling a lie) causes tension.

  • Behavior conflicting with values: Acting against personal morals or values can trigger dissonance and guilt.

  • New information: Encountering facts that challenge deeply held beliefs may cause dissonance, leading to denial or attitude change.

Dissonance Requires Free Choice

Across every cause above, dissonance only arises when a person feels personally responsible for the behavior. No choice, no dissonance. If someone believes they had no real choice, the tension and the pressure to change simply don’t appear.

Freedman (1963) showed dissonance theory and reinforcement theory are not rivals. They apply to different situations: dissonance predicts voluntary behavior, reinforcement predicts involuntary behavior.

Commitment matters too. The person must feel publicly and irrevocably bound to the behaviour before dissonance takes hold (Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

Decision freedom is also decisive. Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) had participants write a counter-attitudinal essay for a large or small fee, under high or low choice.

When choice was high, a larger fee produced less attitude change than a small one. The less-leads-to-more pattern appeared only in this free-choice condition.

When choice was low, the ordinary pattern returned: more money produced more change.

This choice requirement has not held up cleanly, however. A large preregistered replication of a related essay-writing experiment found no extra attitude change under high choice (Vaidis et al., 2024).

It did not test Linder and colleagues’ choice-by-incentive pattern. The Evidence Check above weighs what it does and does not show.

How To Reduce Cognitive Dissonance

Changing attitudes or behaviors can be difficult. Sometimes, people hold onto dissonance or engage in avoidance, denial, or other defense mechanisms that may lead to irrational or inconsistent behaviors.

Festinger (1957) saw people as rationalising, not rational, creatures. They try to appear rational, both to others and to themselves.

He set out four logical routes for lowering dissonance. People can change the behaviour, reject the dissonant belief, add new consonant beliefs, or reduce the importance of the clash. The four strategies below map onto these routes.

resolution of Cognitive dissonance

1. Behavior Change

When the dissonance involves a behavior that conflicts with a belief, the most direct way to reduce it is to change or eliminate the behavior.

For example, a smoker who believes smoking is harmful may quit smoking to resolve the conflict.

However, this can be very challenging because well-learned behaviors or habits are hard to break. People often try mental strategies first.


2. Rationalization

Rationalization involves creating explanations or excuses to make conflicting behavior or beliefs seem acceptable.

Instead of changing behavior, the individual alters how they think about the situation.

For example, a smoker might say, “I only smoke occasionally,” or “It helps me relax,” which lessens the conflict without quitting.


3. Justification through New Information

People often seek or emphasize new information that outweighs the conflicting belief.

For instance, a smoker may focus on studies suggesting that “research has not definitively proven that smoking causes lung cancer.” This lets them reduce the dissonance by questioning the strength of the original belief.

A smoker might also associate with other smokers. After all, if so-and-so smokes, it can’t be that dangerous. Others switch to low-tar cigarettes, or convince themselves that smoking is an important and highly pleasurable activity, worth the risk.


4. Attitude Adjustment

Another powerful way to reduce dissonance is by adjusting one’s attitudes or beliefs to better align with behavior. Attitudes bend to fit actions.

This includes “spreading apart the alternatives”: increasing the attractiveness of the chosen behavior while decreasing the appeal of the rejected options or conflicting beliefs.

For example, someone might convince themselves that “living for today” and enjoying pleasures like smoking is more important than worrying about long-term health consequences.

This reduces the perceived importance of the dissonant cognition, such as “smoking is harmful to my health.”

Evidence Check: Does the Theory Hold Up?

Verdict: Mixed or contested.

Writing an essay against your own view (a counter-attitudinal essay) shifts attitudes, relative to writing a neutral essay. The classic claim that the shift depends on free choice was not reproduced. The test was the largest and only preregistered one.

Whether that reflects a flaw in the classic paradigm, the choice manipulation or the theory’s account of why attitudes shift remains disputed.

Free Choice and Attitude Change

Level of evidence: Experiment; failed to replicate.

The theory holds that dissonance arises only when people feel they freely chose their behaviour. Without choice, there is no dissonance and no attitude change.

The most direct test was a Registered Report, a multilab replication of Croyle and Cooper’s (1983) Experiment 1 (Vaidis et al., 2024). Its design was approved before any data were collected.

Thirty-nine laboratories in 19 countries and 14 languages recruited 4,898 students. They wrote a counter-attitudinal essay under high choice, a counter-attitudinal essay under low choice, or a neutral essay under high choice.

After the registered exclusions, 3,822 participants (38 labs) entered the post-essay analysis and 2,724 (37 labs) the attitude-change analysis. The results were:

  • Manipulation check: Participants felt freer to decline the essay under high choice (M = 6.50) than under low choice (M = 4.44), d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.69, 0.84].
  • Effect of choice: Post-essay attitude under high choice (M = 2.60) against low choice (M = 2.66) gave d = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.04].
  • Attitude change: The same choice contrast gave d = 0.017, 95% CI [-0.071, 0.11].
  • Essay versus neutral: Counter-attitudinal essays exceeded neutral essays on post-essay attitude (d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.18, 0.34]) and attitude change (d = 0.31, 95% CI [0.22, 0.41]).

The earlier evidence looked far stronger, but it was thin. A commentary by members of the replication team audited 104 counter-attitudinal-essay studies (Sleegers et al., 2024).

  • Original experiment: By the replication report’s account, about ten participants per cell and d = 2.40, 95% CI [1.40, 3.37] (Vaidis et al., 2024).
  • Earlier meta-analyses: Two meta-analyses of the paradigm give d = 0.81 and d = 0.51 (Vaidis et al., 2024).
  • Audited studies: A mean of 16.66 participants per condition (median 13.50, range 4.25 to 70), no preregistered study, and only two that shared data.
  • Power: Sleegers et al. (2024) calculate that 86 per cell are needed for 80% power at d = 0.43.

The replication manipulated choice but not incentive. So it does not test the choice-by-incentive interaction of Linder et al. (1967). Cooper (2019) describes that study as a balanced replication in which less-leads-to-more appeared under high decision freedom and not when participants were forced.

How Far Can the Evidence Be Trusted?

Vaidis et al. (2024) is the most trustworthy work here. Its strengths and weaknesses are both specific:

  • Strong design: Preregistered, with an effect-size-based power plan and a manipulation check that passed.
  • Precise null: The choice interval (d from -0.10 to 0.04 on post-essay attitude) excludes an effect as large as d = 0.20, the effect it was powered for.
  • Constructive replication: It used students and changed the issue, languages and procedure relative to Croyle and Cooper (1983), so it is not an exact rerun.
  • Exclusions: One lab was dropped for attrition above the preregistered limit, and one control condition in one lab was discarded for a materials error.
  • Disputed manipulation: Perceived choice under low choice averaged near the scale midpoint. Commentators argued this left participants moderately free (as reported by Sleegers et al., 2024).
  • Not independent: All ten authors of the commentary also wrote the replication, so the audit and the replication count as one research programme.

What This Means for Free Choice

Festinger’s account, as stated above, predicts more attitude change under high choice than under low choice. A self-persuasion account says otherwise. People come to believe the arguments they generate, so attitudes change in both conditions.

Equal change is what the replication found. The registered rerun therefore cuts against the choice condition in this paradigm and fits the rival.

The advantage of the counter-attitudinal essay over the neutral one shows only that writing it moves attitudes. Both accounts predict that.

The result is contested, not refuted. According to Cooper (2019), a co-author of the New Look revision, dissonance requires personal responsibility for a foreseeable aversive consequence. He wrote before the replication.

The replication authors replied that nine audited studies reported higher perceived choice in their low-choice conditions than the replication did. Those studies were still read as supporting the theory.

If contextual or methodological conditions limit when the paradigm works, they add, the theory needs to state them (as reported by Sleegers et al., 2024).

One paradigm, one rerun and one choice manipulation have been tested at scale. The original positive results came from samples too small to estimate an effect reliably.

The claim that choice is necessary is not supported as tested.

Does Dissonance Drive the Attitude Shift?

Level of evidence: Experiment; partly replicated.

People who act against their attitudes feel aversive tension. The theory says they reduce it by changing their attitude to match their behaviour.

The registered replication reproduced the attitude shift against a neutral-essay control (Vaidis et al., 2024). The effects were d = 0.26 on post-essay attitude (3,822 participants) and d = 0.31 on attitude change (2,724 participants).

Exploratory mood-checklist items added a second finding. Both counter-attitudinal groups reported more discomfort than neutral-essay participants, with means of 2.13 for high choice and 2.16 for low choice on “uncomfortable”.

They also reported more conflict (2.61 and 2.66). Neutral-essay participants scored 1.87 and 1.89 (Vaidis et al., 2024).

Within the high-choice counter-attitudinal group, more reported discomfort and conflict went with a less favourable post-essay attitude. The study found no mediating role for either.

The authors ran these affect analyses after the primary tests failed. The study was not designed to test the affect process.

How Far Can the Evidence Be Trusted?

  • Exploratory: The affect results rest on two single-item ratings, so they are weaker than the primary contrasts. The authors caution against reading them as support or contradiction.
  • Contested reading: The literature disagrees on whether affect should relate positively, negatively or not at all to attitude change (Vaidis et al., 2024).
  • Self-persuasion: The control does not separate dissonance from self-persuasion. The authors cannot rule it out, and it does not require arousal or conflict (Vaidis et al., 2024).
  • Better-powered: Croyle and Cooper (1983) had about ten participants per cell, so the multilab study is the better-powered estimate of the same shift (Vaidis et al., 2024).

What This Means for the Mechanism

Dissonance reduction predicts attitude change toward the behaviour, with added discomfort. Self-persuasion predicts the attitude change without it. The reproduced shift and the raised discomfort ratings are what both would produce.

So the result is compatible with dissonance but does not isolate it. The negative link between discomfort and attitude cuts against a simple arousal-then-change sequence. Being exploratory, it cannot settle the question.

The mechanism, as opposed to the shift, is not established by this evidence.

Critical Evaluation

Decades of research on cognitive dissonance have produced strong support for the theory, alongside several genuine challenges.

Before looking at each challenge in detail, here is a quick summary of the main criticisms:

  • Hard to measure: Dissonance cannot be directly observed, so the concept remains somewhat subjective.
  • Ambiguous term: It is unclear whether “dissonance” is a perception, a feeling, or simply guilt.
  • Individual differences: Some people show strong dissonance effects, while others tolerate inconsistency with little discomfort.
  • Low ecological validity: Many classic studies use artificial tasks and rely heavily on student samples.
  • Cultural variation: The classic paradigms may not trigger the same dissonance in every culture.

Strengths: A Testable Theory With Surprising Predictions

The theory’s main strength is that it can be tested in controlled experiments. It also makes counterintuitive, precisely specified predictions.

The less-leads-to-more effect overturned the common-sense prediction that bigger rewards produce more attitude change. Few theories in social psychology have made so sharp a call.

The theory has broad applications too. The same mechanism illuminates smoking, consumer choice, group initiation, health behaviour and religious commitment. It shows that people pursue consistency between attitudes and behaviours, even through irrational means.

Hard to Measure

From a scientific standpoint, though, dissonance cannot be directly observed or objectively measured, a limitation behaviourists have long raised. This makes the concept somewhat subjective.

Ambiguity in the Term “Dissonance”

Is it a perception (as “cognitive” suggests), a feeling, or a feeling about a perception?

Aronson (1968, 1999) reframed dissonance as an inconsistency between a person’s self-concept and their behaviour. Some critics argue that these studies may therefore be measuring guilt or self-image threat rather than a purely cognitive clash.

Is Dissonance a Real Drive State?

This raises a deeper question: is dissonance a genuine, arousal-based tension, as Festinger claimed, or just a cognitive inference with no real feeling behind it? Zanna and Cooper (1974) tested this directly.

  • Aim: To test whether dissonance is a real state of arousal that people are motivated to reduce, or only an inference.
  • Method: Participants wrote essays arguing against their own views, under high or low choice. Each then took a placebo pill described as making them feel tense, relaxed, or nothing in particular.
  • Results: The usual attitude change appeared with the “relaxed” and “no-effect” pills. It disappeared when participants could blame their arousal on the “tense” pill.
  • Conclusion: Dissonance is an unpleasant state of arousal that people are motivated to reduce, not just a belief inferred afterwards.

The most serious challenge to this view comes from Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory. Bem argued dissonance itself is unnecessary.

People lack privileged access to their own attitudes. Instead, they infer them from watching their own behaviour, the same way they would infer someone else’s.

A participant paid just $1 to lie has no other obvious reason for doing so. They infer: “I must have found it interesting.” A participant paid $20 simply attributes the lie to the money.

The two theories predict the same less-leads-to-more pattern. Attitude data alone therefore cannot tell them apart (Eiser & van der Pligt, 1988).

The pill result favours Festinger. Self-perception theory needs no internal tension, so it cannot explain why attitude change vanishes when people blame their arousal on a pill.

Fazio, Zanna and Cooper (1977) proposed a division of labour. Dissonance theory applies where behaviour is clearly counter-attitudinal, which produces measurable arousal. Self-perception theory better explains behaviour within a person’s existing “latitude of acceptance.”

On this view the two are complementary accounts of different cases, not rivals.

Individual Differences

Highly anxious people are more likely to show the dissonance effects the theory predicts. Many others cope with considerable dissonance without feeling the tension the theory predicts.

Aronson’s self-consistency revision makes one difference testable. People with high self-esteem have more positive self-regard to protect, so they should show more dissonance reduction than people with low self-esteem.

Experiments testing this prediction have produced only mixed results (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Dissonance reduction is therefore not a universal, automatic drive.

Ecological Validity and Student Samples

Many studies supporting the theory have low ecological validity.

For example, turning pegs (as in Festinger’s experiment) is an artificial task that doesn’t happen in everyday life.

Also, the majority of experiments used students as participants, which raises issues of a biased sample. Could we generalize the results from such experiments?

Revised Accounts: Inconsistency or Self-Threat?

Later work questioned whether inconsistency itself is what feels aversive. Four revisions move the trigger elsewhere:

  • The New Look: Dissonance arises when people feel responsible for a foreseeable, unwanted consequence.
  • Self-affirmation: Reducing dissonance is one way to protect the self, and affirming another value removes the need.
  • Impression management: Some attitude change reflects the need to look consistent, not a private shift.
  • Self-standards: Whichever standard is accessible decides which revision holds.

The New Look: Aversive Consequences

On Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) account, the $1 participant feels dissonance not because two cognitions clash. They feel it because they freely misled another person for a trivial reward.

That outcome is hard to disown. Dissonance becomes a threat to a moral, competent self, not an abstract logical inconsistency.

Self-Affirmation Theory

People who first reflect on an unrelated but important personal value no longer need to rationalise a counter-attitudinal act. The usual attitude change disappears (Steele, 1988).

Their self-integrity has already been shored up elsewhere. Steele’s account differs from the New Look mainly in scope: any blow to global self-worth counts, not just one specific unwanted consequence.

Impression Management

Schlenker (1982) and Tedeschi and Rosenfield (1981) argued that many experiments reflect impression management: the need to appear consistent to others. On this view, the $1 group’s reported change is real. It is driven by self-presentation, such as avoiding social embarrassment, rather than by cognition.

The Self-Standards Model

Stone and Cooper (2001) proposed that these revisions can all be correct, under different conditions. Dissonance begins when a person judges a committed behaviour against some standard.

Which standard is accessible then decides which revision holds.

When a normative standard (what anyone ought to do) is salient, judgement is fairly uniform, so self-esteem should not moderate dissonance. When a personal standard tied to the self-concept is salient, self-esteem-linked effects should emerge.

The model can therefore predict in advance which pattern a given experiment should produce.

None of these rivals fully displaces Festinger’s theory. Each narrows the range of cases where an aversive drive is the best explanation.

Together they suggest three overlapping mechanisms: inference, self-threat and genuine arousal.

How do people resolve the dissonance when two central aspects of their identity conflict?

Pitt (2010) studied Black gay Christian men who were strongly identified with their church. How did they deal with anti-gay messages from their ministers?

One way to resolve the dissonance would be to change their behavior: switch churches or leave the religion. Many chose to stay.

Those who stayed resolved dissonance by focusing on the shortcomings of the minister. For example, they said, “It’s not my religion that promotes this prejudice—it’s the bigotry of this preacher” (Pitt, 2010).

Cultural Aspects of Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is a universal psychological phenomenon. But the specific beliefs or behaviours that trigger it, and how people resolve it, vary significantly across cultures with different social norms.

Heine and Lehman (1997) used Brehm’s free-choice method with Japanese and Canadian participants rating Western rock and pop CDs. Canadians showed the usual spreading-of-alternatives effect. The Japanese participants did not.

Culture shapes how dissonance is triggered and resolved:

  • Group harmony: In collectivist societies, where maintaining group harmony often takes precedence over individual desires, outward dissonance-reducing behaviors may be less visible.
  • Shame: Individuals in these cultures may experience stronger internal dissonance when their actions bring shame or disappointment to their family or community.
  • Vicarious dissonance: Japanese individuals might feel dissonance on behalf of close friends or family who behave inconsistently (Heine & Lehman, 1997). They may then adjust their own attitudes to match.
  • Public choices: Choices made in public, where social evaluation is high, create more pressure for dissonance reduction, especially in cultures emphasizing social conformity.

The dissonance still exists in every case. Culture shapes whether it arises, and how urgently people need to resolve it.

Contemporary Research

Dissonance research has moved in three directions since the classic studies. One strand asks what the “discomfort” of dissonance really is.

A second strand tests whether the classic lab methods measure it cleanly. A third checks whether deliberately triggering dissonance changes real-world behaviour at scale.

Reconceiving the Drive State

The most significant modern refinement holds that logical inconsistency itself is not what makes dissonance unpleasant.

On Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones and Levy’s (2015) action-based model, our thoughts automatically prime the actions linked to them.

In other words, dissonance strikes when thoughts pull toward competing actions, not simply when ideas clash.

Discomfort arises specifically when two thoughts imply competing actions. Deciding what to do next becomes hard in that moment.

This reframes Festinger’s original clash of cognitions as a functional alarm. The signal says the conflict needs resolving before a person can act effectively.

Logical inconsistency, on its own, isn’t what hurts.

Brain imaging backs this up. Activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex tracks dissonance arousal. This region monitors conflict.

Ventral striatum activity, linked to approach motivation, tracks its resolution (Harmon-Jones et al., 2015).

Harmon-Jones and colleagues treat this pairing of behavioural and brain evidence as mutual support. The neuroscience corroborates the theoretical shift, rather than standing apart from it as an isolated finding.

Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2007) tested the link causally. In one study, students who freely chose to write an essay supporting an unpopular tuition increase showed more attitude change than students given no choice.

They also showed greater relative left frontal brain activity, an EEG pattern linked to approach motivation.

A further study used neurofeedback. Participants trained toward less left frontal activity showed less spreading of alternatives after a difficult decision than untrained participants.

The physiology was manipulated and the behaviour measured. That makes this one of the few cases where a neural substrate has been shown to contribute causally to dissonance reduction.

Questioning the Classic Methods

A second strand asks a harder question: do the classic paradigms measure real change at all?

Chen and Risen (2010) re-examined Brehm’s (1956) rate-choose-rate design, in which people rate options, choose between two, then rate them again. They showed the design can produce apparent preference change as a statistical artefact of the choice itself, even when no real dissonance-driven shift has occurred.

The choice itself is revealing. Picking between two closely rated options can expose a person’s pre-existing, slightly stronger preference. The second rating then simply restates that preference as if it were new attitude change.

The critique didn’t disprove the effect. It raised the evidential bar instead: once tighter controls are used, much of the free-choice spreading still survives.

It remains a caution against reading attitude change directly off any single classic paradigm. That’s one reason researchers today weight converging designs more heavily than any lone procedure.

A larger test targeted the induced-compliance paradigm itself. A preregistered multilab replication tested it. Thirty-nine laboratories recruited 4,898 students.

Writing a counter-attitudinal essay shifted attitudes. The classic advantage of high over low perceived choice did not appear (Vaidis et al., 2024).

The replication authors concluded that the evidence behind the paradigm is thin, because earlier studies were small and unregistered (Sleegers et al., 2024). The Evidence Check above weighs the result in full.

Dissonance on Someone Else’s Behalf

A further strand asks whether people can feel dissonance for someone else. Norton, Monin, Cooper and Hogg (2003) coined the term vicarious dissonance, blending dissonance theory with social identity theory.

  • Aim: To test whether people can feel dissonance when someone from their own group behaves inconsistently.
  • Method: Students watched a fellow student (in fact a confederate) freely write a statement supporting a tuition-fee increase he privately opposed. The statement might be used to sway university officials.
  • Results: Observers who shared the writer’s group membership shifted their own attitudes toward supporting the increase, despite making no choice. The more positively they felt about the group, the larger the shift.
  • Conclusion: Vicarious arousal mediated the effect. Observers who would have felt more uncomfortable in the writer’s position showed more attitude change.

Group identification can therefore carry the same aversive arousal that Zanna and Cooper (1974) found in firsthand dissonance.

Scaling Up: Dissonance-Based Prevention Programmes

The strongest evidence now comes from applied prevention trials, not lab demonstrations.

These programmes have at-risk young women voluntarily argue against the thin ideal promoted by media and culture. Arguing against a view they might privately hold arouses dissonance. Participants resolve it by adopting a healthier body attitude.

  • Aim: Stice, Marti, Shaw and Rohde (2019) set out to estimate how well dissonance-based eating-disorder prevention programmes work, and which features predict the largest effects.
  • Method: The team synthesised 56 trials evaluating 68 dissonance-based programmes, covering 7,808 participants, against both minimal-intervention and alternative-intervention controls.
  • Results: The programmes worked. Against minimal-intervention controls, effect sizes reached 0.57 for thin-ideal internalisation, 0.42 for body dissatisfaction, 0.37 for dieting and 0.31 for eating-disorder symptoms.
  • Conclusion: Deliberately induced dissonance produces robust, real-world behaviour change at scale. The moderators identified offer a template for more effective interventions.

Effects held up, even against active alternative interventions. The comparator effect sizes were 0.31, 0.18, 0.17 and 0.13 across the same four outcomes.

Bigger effects came from programmes with more dissonance-inducing activities, larger in-person groups, and more sessions.

One finding cut against the theory’s own logic. Paid participants showed larger effects too, even though payment should supply an external justification and dampen dissonance. Engagement, not dissonance alone, may explain the anomaly.

The moderator analyses are correlational, not experimental, so they cannot prove the dissonance-heightening features directly cause the larger effects. Even so, the pattern holds across dozens of trials and thousands of real participants.

Real-World Applications

Cognitive dissonance theory isn’t just a laboratory curiosity. Its logic underpins several deliberate strategies for changing real behaviour outside the lab, from public health to marketing.

Advocacy and Attitude Change

Getting someone to argue for a position out loud, with little pressure or reward, produces deeper private attitude change than a big incentive ever could.

This is the same induced-compliance logic behind the $1/$20 experiment. It still works today.

Advocacy campaigns, teachers, and persuaders exploit it by asking people to make the case themselves, rather than simply telling them what to think.

A person who freely makes an argument owns it. Someone who is just told what to think never does.

The $1/$20 experiment shows the mechanism at its purest. Participants paid too little to justify the lie resolved the dissonance by coming to believe it. A big incentive would have let them shrug it off, changing nothing they believed.

Health Behaviour Change (Hypocrisy Induction)

Public health researchers use a technique called hypocrisy induction to change habits like unsafe sex, poor sun protection, or wasteful water use.

The technique works in three steps:

  1. Advocate: People are first asked to publicly advocate the healthy behaviour.
  2. Remind: Later, they are reminded of times they failed to practise it themselves.
  3. Resolve: What they preached and what they did don’t match, which creates dissonance. The advocacy can’t be taken back, so most people bring their behaviour in line with it.

Field experiments support the technique. Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson and Miller (1992) made patrons of a campus recreation facility feel hypocritical about their showering habits. Those patrons took shorter showers than controls.

Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow and Fried (1994) used the same procedure for safe sex. More sexually active young adults in the hypocrisy condition bought condoms, and on average they bought more of them than controls did.

The technique has one limit, though. It can only close a gap for people who already hold the healthy belief; it cannot create that value from nothing.

Marketing and Consumer Behaviour

Post-decisional dissonance drives the familiar experience of buyer’s remorse, and the ways people talk themselves out of it.

After an expensive purchase, buyers often reduce dissonance in three ways:

  • Seeking reviews: Buyers look for positive reviews of what they bought.
  • Avoiding comparisons: They steer clear of comparing their choice with the rejected alternative.
  • Talking it up: They praise what they bought.

This is the same “spreading of alternatives” seen in Brehm’s experiment, playing out after a real purchase.

Marketers exploit this pattern deliberately. Reassurance emails after a purchase, and small effortful commitments like loyalty schemes, both increase the attachment that dissonance-reduction already creates.

The same dynamic shapes everyday decisions too, from choosing a university course to picking a phone contract. Once the choice is made and hard to reverse, the mind gets to work justifying it. Brehm found the same spreading of alternatives with household appliances.

What is the difference between cognitive dissonance theory and balance theory?

Cognitive dissonance theory, proposed by Festinger, focuses on the discomfort felt when holding conflicting beliefs or attitudes, leading individuals to seek consistency.

Heider’s Balance Theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the desire for balanced relations among triads of entities, such as people and their attitudes. When these relations are unbalanced, the theory predicts attitudes will change to restore balance.
Both theories address cognitive consistency, but in different contexts.

References

Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 5–27). Rand McNally.

Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance, hypocrisy, and the self-concept. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 103–126). American Psychological Association.

Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1963). Effect of the severity of threat on the devaluation of forbidden behavior. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66(6), 584–588. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0039901

Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(2), 177–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047195

Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0024835

Brehm, J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(3), 384–389. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041006

Brehm, J. W., & Cohen, A. R. (1962). Explorations in cognitive dissonance. John Wiley & Sons.

Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(4), 573–594. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020217

Cooper, J. (2019). Cognitive dissonance: Where we’ve been and where we’re going. International Review of Social Psychology, 32(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.277

Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60121-5

Croyle, R. T., & Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(4), 782–791. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.782

Dickerson, C. A., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22(11), 841–854. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00928.x

Eiser, J. R., & van der Pligt, J. (1988). Attitudes and decisions. Routledge.

Fazio, R. H., Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1977). Dissonance and self-perception: An integrative view of each theory’s proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13(5), 464–479. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(77)90031-2

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.

Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593

Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails: A social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world. University of Minnesota Press. https://doi.org/10.1037/10030-000

Freedman, J. L. (1963). Attitudinal effects of inadequate justification. Journal of Personality, 31(3), 371–385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1963.tb01305.x

Freedman, J. L. (1965). Long-term behavioral effects of cognitive dissonance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1(2), 145–155. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(65)90042-9

Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2007). Cognitive dissonance theory after 50 years of development. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38(1), 7–16. https://doi.org/10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7

Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Levy, N. (2015). An action-based model of cognitive-dissonance processes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(3), 184–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414566449

Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(4), 389–400. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167297234005

Knox, R. E., & Inkster, J. A. (1968). Postdecision dissonance at post time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 319–323. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0025528

Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children’s intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the “overjustification” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), 129–137. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035519

Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1967). Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6(3), 245–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021220

Norton, M. I., Monin, B., Cooper, J., & Hogg, M. A. (2003). Vicarious dissonance: Attitude change from the inconsistency of others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(1), 47–62. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.1.47

Pitt, R. N. (2010). “Killing the messenger”: Religious black gay men’s neutralization of anti‐gay religious messages. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 49(1), 56–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01492.x

Sakai, H. (1999). A multiplicative power-function model of cognitive dissonance: Toward an integrated theory of cognition, emotion, and behavior after Leon Festinger. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 267–294). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10318-011

Schlenker, B. R. (1982). Translating actions into attitudes: An identity-analytic approach to the explanation of social conduct. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 15, pp. 193–247). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60298-1

Sleegers, W. W. A., van Leeuwen, F., Ross, R. M., DeMarree, K. G., van Beest, I., Priolo, D., Martinie, M.-A., Morvinski, C., Verschuere, B., & Vaidis, D. C. (2024). When replication fails: What to conclude and not to conclude? Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(4), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459241268197

Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60229-4

Stice, E., Marti, C. N., Shaw, H., & Rohde, P. (2019). Meta-analytic review of dissonance-based eating disorder prevention programs: Intervention, participant, and facilitator features that predict larger effects. Clinical Psychology Review, 70, 91–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2019.04.004

Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., & Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(1), 116–128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167294201012

Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(3), 228–243. https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.2000.1446

Tedeschi, J. T., & Rosenfield, P. (1981). Impression management theory and the forced compliance situation. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), Impression management theory and social psychological research (pp. 147–177). Academic Press.

Vaidis, D. C., Sleegers, W. W. A., van Leeuwen, F., DeMarree, K. G., Sætrevik, B., Ross, R. M., Schmidt, K., Protzko, J., Morvinski, C., Ghasemi, O., Roberts, A. J., Stone, J., Bran, A., Gourdon-Kanhukamwe, A., Gunsoy, C., Moussaoui, L. S., Smith, A. R., Nugier, A., Fayant, M.-P., . . . Priolo, D. (2024). A multilab replication of the induced-compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459231213375

Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1974). Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29(5), 703–709. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0036651

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology, where she contributes accessible content on psychological topics. She is also an autistic PhD student at the University of Birmingham, researching autistic camouflaging in higher education.


Saul McLeod, PhD

Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol)

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD, is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.