Self-Concept in Psychology

The self-concept is a general term for how someone thinks about, evaluates, or perceives themselves. To be aware of oneself is to have a concept of oneself.

Self-concept forms through experiences, interactions, and reflection, shaping behavior, emotions, and relationships; a healthy version supports well-being, while a negative one can fuel emotional and social difficulties.

Baumeister (1999) provides the following self-concept definition: “The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

Key Takeaways

  • Definition: Self-concept is your overall belief about who you are, including your traits, roles, and sense of self.
  • Existential Self: The earliest self-awareness, a basic sense of existing separately from others, appears from around two to three months old.
  • Categorical Self: Children learn to place themselves into categories, such as age and gender, before later describing themselves in psychological terms.
  • Self-Image: Self-image is the mental picture you hold of yourself, including how you think others see you.
  • Ideal Self: The ideal self is who you want to become; a large gap from your self-image can lower self-esteem.
  • Self-Esteem: How much you value yourself is shaped by others’ reactions, comparison with peers, social roles, and identification (Argyle, 1983).
  • Modern Evidence: Recent research finds milestones like mirror self-recognition are not culturally universal and vary with parenting style.

Aspects

The self-concept is an important term for both social and humanistic psychology. Lewis (1990) suggests that the development of a concept of self has two aspects:

(1) The Existential Self

This is “the most basic part of the self-scheme or self-concept; the sense of being separate and distinct from others and the awareness of the constancy of the self” (Bee, 1992).

The existential self is a concept within developmental psychology, particularly in the study of infant development. It refers to the basic and most fundamental understanding that an individual exists as a separate and distinct entity from others.

This realization typically begins in infancy, as early as a few months old, when a baby recognizes its existence apart from the external world.

Other species show similarly early self-awareness (Buss, 1992). What makes human self-knowledge distinctive is becoming aware that we have it: conscious of our own existence and uniqueness.

The child realizes that they exist as a separate entity from others and continue to exist over time and space.

The existential self is foundational. More complex aspects of self-concept, like the categorical self (understanding oneself through memberships such as gender, skills, and age), build on this base.

According to Lewis (1990), awareness of the existential self begins as young as two to three months old and arises in part due to the child’s relationship with the world.

For example, the child smiles, and someone smiles back, or the child touches a mobile and sees it move.

  • Aim: Amsterdam (1972) tested when infants first recognize their own mirror image as themselves, rather than treating it as a stranger or a playmate.
  • Method: Eighty-eight infants aged 3 to 24 months were secretly marked with a spot of red rouge on the nose or cheek, then observed in front of a mirror for self-directed, mark-relevant touching.
  • Results: From 6 to 12 months, infants treated their reflection as a playmate. Self-conscious, embarrassed reactions appeared from 14 months, and unambiguous mark-directed touching only emerged between 20 and 24 months, in 65% of infants that age.
  • Conclusion: Mirror self-recognition is not present from birth; it assembles gradually across the second year, through an ordered sequence of social, then wary, then self-conscious reactions.

(2) The Psychological Self

Between the existential and categorical self sits a third aspect: the psychological self, a private, thinking self that others cannot directly see.

  • Aim/Method: Flavell, Shipstead, and Croft (1978) asked 2½- to 5-year-olds how a doll differs from a person, then asked children where they “do their thinking and knowing.”
  • Findings: Most children said dolls cannot think or know their name, but people can; 14 of 22 located their own thinking “in their heads.”
  • Conclusion: By around 3½ to 4 years, children grasp that they have a private, thinking self, invisible even to someone looking directly at them.

This private self is closely tied to theory of mind: the understanding that another person can hold a belief that is false.

  • Aim: Wimmer and Perner (1983) tested whether children can predict that another person will act on a false belief rather than on reality.
  • Method: Children aged 3 to 9 watched a doll, Maxi, put chocolate in a green cupboard before his mother secretly moved it to a blue one. Children were asked where Maxi would look for it.
  • Results: Children aged 3 to 4 usually pointed to the chocolate’s real location. From about 4 to 6, most began predicting Maxi would look in the original, now-wrong, location.
  • Conclusion: Representing another person’s false belief, a genuine theory of mind, emerges during the preschool years, around the same age children first describe a private, invisible self.

A 2019 meta-analysis of 56 false-belief conditions across 1,469 infants found only a modest effect that shrank as more recent, better-controlled studies were included (Barone, Corradi, & Gomila, 2019). Claims that the psychological self appears much earlier than the preschool years deserve caution.

(3) The Categorical Self

Having realized that he or she exists as a separate experiencing being, the child becomes aware that he or she is also an object in the world.

The categorical self involves the understanding that one can be categorized into various groups based on traits, roles, and attributes.

Objects have properties: big, small, red, smooth, and so on. The child is becoming aware that they, too, are an object with properties that others can experience.

The self, too, can be put into categories such as age, gender, size, or skill. Two of the first categories to be applied are age (“I am 3”) and gender (“I am a girl”).

This categorization starts remarkably early. By 9 months, infants already recognize faces from their own racial group more easily than other faces (Vogel, Monesson, & Scott, 2012).

In early childhood, the categories children apply to themselves are very concrete (e.g., hair color, height, and favorite things).

Later, self-description also begins to include reference to internal psychological traits, comparative evaluations, and how others see them.

For instance, a child might call herself a “big girl.” Or they might point to having “brown hair,” or say they are “good at drawing.”

The categorical self lays the foundation for more intricate self-identifications as one matures.

Self-Image

Self-image refers to the mental representation or picture that individuals have of themselves, encompassing both physical appearance and personal traits.

It’s how people perceive themselves and believe others perceive them. Personal experiences, interactions with others, societal standards, and media influences, can shape this perception.

self image

This does not necessarily have to reflect reality. Indeed, a person with anorexia who is thin may have a self-image in which the person believes they are fat.

A person’s self-image is shaped by many factors: parental influences, friends, and the media all play a part.

Self-image is a key part of the overall self-concept. It matters for self-esteem and confidence, and it can influence behavior, choices, and relationships. A person’s self-image can also change over time, based on experience, feedback, and personal reflection.

The Twenty Statements Test

Kuhn (1960) investigated the self-image by using The Twenty Statements Test.

He asked people to answer “Who am I?” in 20 different ways.

He found that the responses could be divided into two major groups.

These were social roles and personality traits. Social roles are external, objective aspects of oneself, such as son, teacher, or friend. Personality traits are internal, affective qualities, such as being gregarious, impatient, or humorous.

The list of answers to the question “Who Am I?” probably includes examples of each of the following four types of responses:

  1. Physical Description: I’m tall, have blue eyes…etc.
  2. Social Roles: We are all social beings whose behavior is shaped to some extent by the roles we play. Such roles as student, housewife, or member of the football team not only help others to recognize us but also help us to know what is expected of us in various situations.
  3. Personal Traits: These are the third dimension of our self-descriptions. “I’m impulsive…I’m generous…I tend to worry a lot,”…etc.
  4. Existential Statements (abstract ones): These can range from “I’m a child of the universe” to “I’m a human being” to “I’m a spiritual being, “…etc.

Typically, young people describe themselves more in terms of personal traits, whereas older people feel defined to a greater extent by their social roles.

The age pattern is measurable. Kuhn found 7-year-olds gave an average of five role-related answers, compared to about ten among undergraduates (Kuhn, 1960).

Actual Self

The actual self is how individuals currently see themselves based on their self-awareness and introspection. It represents the attributes, roles, competencies, and characteristics that a person believes they genuinely possess at the present moment.

While “actual self” and “self-image” are closely related and often used interchangeably in casual discussions, psychology treats them as distinct concepts. Here is how they differ:

  1. Actual Self:
    • Represents an individual’s current perception of themselves based on attributes, roles, and abilities they believe they genuinely possess.
    • Serves as a baseline for comparison with other self-representations, like the ideal self or ought self.
  2. Self-Image: The mental picture people hold of themselves, covering both appearance and perceived traits (see Self-Image, above).

In essence, the “actual self” is a broader construct that might include one’s self-image as a component.

The actual self covers the entirety of an individual’s current self-perception, while the self-image focuses more on the visual or representational aspect and perceived traits.

Both, however, are integral parts of an individual’s overall self-concept.

Self-Esteem

Self-esteem (also known as self-worth) refers to the extent to which we like, accept, or approve of ourselves or how much we value ourselves.

Self-esteem always involves a degree of evaluation, and we may have either a positive or a negative view of ourselves.

Factors influencing self-esteem include:

  • Childhood experiences
  • Feedback from others
  • Comparisons with peers
  • Societal standards and cultural influences
  • Personal achievements or failures

High Self-Esteem: Individuals with high self-esteem generally believe that they have good qualities and value themselves positively. They often handle life challenges better, are more resilient, and have a positive outlook on life.

  • Confidence in our own abilities
  • Self-acceptance
  • Not worrying about what others think
  • Optimism

Low Self-Esteem: Those with low self-esteem tend to view themselves negatively, doubt their abilities, and are more critical of themselves. They are more susceptible to experiencing feelings of worthlessness, depression, and anxiety.

  • Lack of confidence
  • Want to be/look like someone else
  • Always worrying about what others might think
  • Pessimism

Having a balanced self-esteem is crucial for mental well-being. While high self-esteem is generally beneficial, overly inflated self-esteem can lead to narcissism.

On the other hand, chronically low self-esteem can contribute to a host of psychological issues, including depression and anxiety.

Measurement

There are several ways of measuring self-esteem. For example, Harrill Self-Esteem Inventory is a questionnaire comprising 15 statements about a range of interests.

Another example is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is a neutral cartoon given to the participant, who then has to devise a story about what’s going on.

The most widely used instruments work differently. Coopersmith’s fifty-item Self-Esteem Inventory asks children whether statements about themselves are “like me” or “not like me” (Coopersmith, 1967).

Rosenberg’s ten-item scale takes a different approach. It asks adults to rate broad statements about their own worth, and remains the most-used self-esteem measure in research today (Rosenberg, 1965).

Picture-based tests like the TAT try to sidestep this self-presentation problem instead. But their reliability and validity are markedly weaker than the questionnaires. Most contemporary research relies on the inventories instead.

Causes

Argyle (1983) identified 4 major factors that influence self-esteem.

1. The Reaction of Others

If people admire us, flatter us, seek out our company, listen attentively and agree with us, we tend to develop a positive self-image.

If they avoid, neglect, and tell us things about ourselves that we don’t want to hear, we develop a negative self-image.

Cooley (1902) named this mechanism the looking-glass self: we build our self-image from how we imagine others see us, and react with pride or embarrassment accordingly.

2. Comparison with Others

Comparing ourselves with our reference group shapes this too. If they seem more successful, happier, richer, or better-looking than us, we tend to develop a negative self-image. If they seem less successful than us, our self-image tends to be more positive instead. Festinger (1954) first formalised this social comparison process.

3. Social Roles

Some social roles carry prestige, e.g., doctor, airline pilot, TV presenter, and premiership footballer, and this promotes self-esteem.

Other roles carry a stigma. E.g., a prisoner, mental hospital patient, refuse collector, or unemployed person.

4. Identification

Roles aren’t just “out there.” They also become part of our personality, i.e., we identify with the positions we occupy, the roles we play, and the groups we belong to.

But just as important as all these factors is the quality of a child’s relationship with their parents.

  • Aim: Coopersmith (1967) asked what actually produces high or low self-esteem in children: objective advantages like money and looks, or something about how parents treat their children.
  • Method: Preadolescent boys completed a self-esteem inventory, and their mothers were interviewed in depth about parenting practices. The boys also completed further behavioural tasks.
  • Results: Self-esteem was not related to family income, parental education, or the boy’s looks. It was related to parental acceptance, clear and consistently enforced limits, and respect for the child’s initiative within those limits.
  • Conclusion: High self-esteem is built from warm, structured parenting, not material advantage. Firm limits combined with acceptance, not their absence, produced the most confident children.

Experiments

  • Aim: Morse and Gergen (1970) tested whether self-esteem can shift rapidly in uncertain or anxiety-arousing situations.
  • Method: Participants waited for a job interview alongside a confederate dressed either as “Mr. Clean” (smart suit, briefcase) or “Mr. Dirty” (old T-shirt, a cheap novel).
  • Results: Self-esteem rose in participants paired with Mr. Dirty and fell in those paired with Mr. Clean.
  • Conclusion: Because self-esteem affects performance (Coopersmith, 1967), Mr. Dirty’s group might have performed better in the interview, though this was not measured.

Even though self-esteem might fluctuate, there are times when we continue to believe good things about ourselves, even when evidence to the contrary exists. This is known as the perseverance effect.

Miller and Ross (1975) showed that people who believed they had socially desirable characteristics continued in this belief even when the experimenters tried to get them to believe the opposite.

Does the same thing happen with bad things if we have low self-esteem?  Maybe not. Perhaps with very low self-esteem, all we believe about ourselves might be bad.

Ideal Self

The ideal self refers to the person an individual aspires to become. It embodies one’s goals, ambitions, and dreams, encompassing attributes, behaviors, and traits a person values and wishes to possess. This concept is pivotal in understanding personal development and self-concept.

Key points about the ideal self:

  1. Comparison with Real Self: The ideal self stands in contrast to the “real self,” which represents how a person currently sees themselves. The gap between these two concepts can influence self-esteem. A smaller gap can lead to higher self-esteem, while a larger gap can result in feelings of dissatisfaction or inadequacy.
  2. Dynamic Nature: The ideal self is not static; it evolves based on life experiences, societal influences, personal aspirations, and changing values.
  3. Motivation: The ideal self can serve as a motivational force, pushing individuals to pursue personal growth, learn new skills, and strive for self-improvement.
  4. Potential Pitfalls: While the ideal self can be a source of inspiration, an unattainable or overly perfectionistic ideal self can lead to disappointment, low self-esteem, and mental distress.

Carl Rogers, a humanistic psychologist, emphasized the importance of achieving congruence between the real self and the ideal self for overall psychological well-being.

A mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and what you’d like to be (your ideal self) affects how much you value yourself. The bigger the gap, the lower your self-esteem.

Therefore, there is an intimate relationship between self-image, ego-ideal, and self-esteem. Humanistic psychologists study this using the Q-Sort Method.

It works by sorting self-descriptive cards twice: once for your current self, once for your ideal self.

The two sortings are then correlated to reveal the gap.

A person’s ideal self may not be consistent with what actually happens in the life and experiences of the person. Hence, a difference may exist between a person’s ideal self and actual experience. This is called incongruence.

Where a person’s ideal self and actual experience are consistent or very similar, a state of congruence exists. Rarely, if ever, does a total state of congruence exist; all people experience a certain amount of incongruence.

The development of congruence is dependent on unconditional positive regard. Rogers believed that for a person to achieve self-actualization, they must be in a state of congruence.

A recent randomized trial supports this. Imagining your best possible future self directly boosted positive expectancy and mood, and indirectly reduced anxiety symptoms (Booth et al., 2025).

Michael Argyle (1983) identified four major factors that influence its development:

  1. The ways in which others (particularly significant others, the important people in someone’s life, such as parents or teachers) react to us.
  2. How we think we compare to others
  3. Our social roles
  4. The extent to which we identify with other people

Self-Discrepancy Theory: The Ought Self

Higgins (1987) extended Rogers’s single self-image/ideal-self gap into a fuller theory. He proposed three self-domains, compared against two standpoints (your own view, and a significant other’s).

  • Actual self: the attributes you believe you currently have.
  • Ideal self: the attributes you or someone close to you hope you will have.
  • Ought self: the attributes you or someone close to you believe you should have, such as duties and obligations.

Different gaps produce different emotions. An actual/ideal gap signals missing positive outcomes, producing dejection: disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness. An actual/ought gap signals a looming negative outcome instead, producing agitation: fear, threat, restlessness.

  • Aim: Higgins et al. (1986) tested whether the size, accessibility, and type of self-discrepancy predict distinct emotional patterns.
  • Method: Undergraduates completed a questionnaire measuring their actual, ideal, and ought selves. One gap type was then primed, and mood was measured before and after.
  • Results: A larger actual/ideal gap predicted dejection-related feelings, while a larger actual/ought gap predicted agitation-related feelings instead. Priming either gap produced its matching emotional pattern.
  • Conclusion: Self-discrepancies do not just accompany distress. Activating one causes the matching emotional state, supporting a causal role for self-structure in emotion.

Self-Schemas and Possible Selves

The self-concept does not store information about you as an unsorted list. Two ideas explain how your self-knowledge is organised, and how it reaches into the future.

Self-Schemas

Markus (1977) proposed that self-knowledge is organised into self-schemas: cognitive generalisations about yourself, built from past experience, that guide how you process self-relevant information in specific areas.

Schematicity is domain-specific.

If you see yourself as clearly athletic, or clearly not athletic, and the trait matters to you, you are self-schematic on that dimension. If you have no clear view either way, you are aschematic on it.

The same person can hold a strong schema for independence and no schema at all for creativity.

  • Aim: Markus (1977) asked whether being self-schematic in a domain changes how quickly and confidently you process self-relevant information, and whether it makes you resistant to information that contradicts it.
  • Method: Undergraduates rated themselves on independence-dependence and were sorted into schematics for independence, schematics for dependence, and aschematics. Weeks later, they judged trait words, gave evidence for their self-view, predicted their own future behaviour, and rated feedback that contradicted it.
  • Results: Schematics judged schema-consistent words faster, gave more specific supporting evidence, predicted more schema-consistent behaviour, and were more likely to reject the contradicting feedback as inaccurate. Aschematics showed none of these effects.
  • Conclusion: The self-concept is not a passive store of facts about you. It actively selects, interprets, and defends the self-relevant information you have already organised.

Possible Selves

Markus and Nurius (1986) extended this idea forward in time. They argued the self-concept also contains possible selves: images of who you might become, who you would like to become, and who you are afraid of becoming.

Possible selves link the self-concept to motivation. They give your goals a personal, self-relevant shape, and they can influence major life choices, such as a career path.

On this view, the ideal self is just one member of a larger family of future-oriented self-images. A feared self can motivate you as powerfully as a hoped-for one.

Critical Evaluation

The developmental sequence and mechanisms described above rest on one real limitation: most of the evidence comes from a narrow slice of the world’s children. This section weighs how far the classic findings generalise, and what more recent, better-controlled studies add.

Western-Centric Research Samples

The classic sequence, from the existential self through to Argyle’s four mechanisms, was mapped almost entirely in Western, English-speaking, and usually urban middle-class samples. Coopersmith’s (1967) influential self-esteem study, for example, tested only white, middle-class American boys. Damon and Hart (1988) themselves report real cultural differences in how self-concept develops.

This is not a minor sampling problem.

Self-concept development is shaped by parenting style and specific cultural practices, not just by biological maturation. The cross-cultural research below sharpens this into a specific, testable finding: a whole milestone can look delayed, or absent, simply because a task assumes an unfamiliar style of self-construal.

The stakes are practical, not just theoretical.

Interventions and parenting advice built on one culture’s timeline may not transfer to children raised in a different tradition.

Contemporary Research

Recent cross-cultural studies test whether one of the sequence’s best-known milestones, mirror self-recognition, is a human universal or a culturally specific one.

Cebioğlu and Broesch (2021) compared 57 urban Canadian and rural ni-Vanuatu toddlers, aged 18 to 22 months, on the standard mirror mark test. Canadian toddlers passed 68% of the time, against just 7% among ni-Vanuatu toddlers.

The gap is striking.

The researchers ruled out simpler explanations, such as motivation to touch marks or understanding of mirrors, before reaching their conclusion. Mothers’ imitation of their toddler during play predicted mirror self-recognition and explained much of this gap, pointing to a specific parenting style rather than a difference in underlying self-awareness.

Ross, Yilmaz, Dale, Cassidy, Yildirim, and Zeedyk (2017) compared Scottish, Zambian, and Turkish 15- to 18-month-olds. The contact styles differed.

Distal, verbal mother-infant contact in Scotland predicted success on the classic mirror test. Proximal, physical contact in Zambia predicted success on a different self-awareness task instead.

Together, these studies suggest the mirror test measures an autonomous, individually oriented self-concept that some cultures cultivate more than others. It does not simply measure the emergence of self-awareness itself.

The well-replicated milestones in this sequence, such as mirror self-recognition in the second year, remain solid. But claims that push self-awareness earlier in age, or assume it looks the same everywhere, deserve the same scrutiny.

How Self-Esteem Changes With Age

Does self-esteem collapse in the teenage years, as popular writing often claims? The best evidence says no.

  • Aim: Orth et al. (2018) set out to map the normative path of self-esteem across the whole lifespan.
  • Method: A meta-analysis of 331 longitudinal samples and 164,868 participants aged 4 to 94, tracking change within the same people rather than across different age groups.
  • Results: Self-esteem rose from age 4 to 11, held stable from 11 to 15, then rose strongly to a peak around age 60 to 70 before declining gradually to 94. The pattern held across gender, country, and ethnicity.
  • Conclusion: Self-esteem follows a robust rise-then-decline curve, not a fixed trait. The adolescent “collapse” assumed by much popular writing is better described as a brief plateau within an otherwise rising curve.

Does Self-Esteem Actually Matter?

Self-esteem is often treated as the cause of success, happiness, and good relationships. The evidence for that claim is far more mixed than popular advice suggests.

  • Aim: Baumeister et al. (2003) reviewed whether high self-esteem causes better school and job performance, better relationships, or a healthier lifestyle.
  • Method: A systematic review that favoured objective outcome measures and longitudinal or experimental designs over simple self-report correlations.
  • Results: Links to school and job performance were modest, and mostly ran from good performance to higher self-esteem rather than the reverse. Self-esteem did not prevent smoking, drinking, or early sexual activity, and did not explain aggression.
  • Conclusion: Self-esteem is largely an outcome of success rather than its cause, so blanket programmes to raise it are not well supported.

Later meta-analyses complicate this picture for mental health specifically. Sowislo and Orth (2013) pooled 77 longitudinal studies on depression and anxiety. Lower self-esteem predicted later depression more strongly than depression predicted later low self-esteem, supporting a genuine, if modest, causal role.

The debate went public in 2022. As Ulrich Orth and Richard Robins conclude in their review, self-esteem carries small but genuine benefits across relationships, school, work, and health.

Joachim Krueger, Roy Baumeister, and Kathleen Vohs counter, in the same journal issue, that effects this small do not justify the practical claims often built on them. Neither side disputes that the effect exists; they disagree about how much weight it can bear.

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Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology, where she contributes accessible content on psychological topics. She is also an autistic PhD student at the University of Birmingham, researching autistic camouflaging in higher education.


Saul McLeod, PhD

Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol)

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD, is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.