BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester
Saul McLeod, PhD, is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.
Inattentional blindness refers to the failure to notice something that is completely visible due to a lack of attention. For example, searching for one’s glasses and failing to notice they are on top of one’s head.
Key Takeaways
Definition: Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice something fully visible because attention is engaged elsewhere.
Origins: Ulric Neisser first studied the phenomenon in the 1970s. Irvin Rock and Arien Mack named it ‘inattentional blindness’ in 1992.
Causes: Low sensory or cognitive conspicuity, lower working memory capacity, and a higher mental workload can all raise the risk.
Real-World Risk: Car crashes, aircraft incidents, and missed threats during police vehicle stops are real consequences of inattentional blindness.
Task Demand: Inattentional blindness becomes more likely, not less, as a task demands more attention.
Verdict: Supported with qualifications. The core effect is well replicated, but whether missed objects are processed remains unproven.
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Criteria
Even salient objects can go unseen when other stimuli claim one’s attention (Simons & Chabris, 1999). The unawareness is temporary.
The criteria below are essential to identify an occurrence of inattentional blindness (Rock, Linnett, Grant & Mack, 1992):
The observer fails to recognize a visual event or object.
The optic stimulus is fully visible.
The stimulus would be readily identifiable if the observer consciously noticed it.
The stimulus is unanticipated, and the failure to recognize it stems from a collapse of attention and not from any drawbacks of the visual scene or the optic stimulus.
Inattentional blindness is distinct from other failures of visual recognition.
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These include attentional blinking, repetition blindness, visual masking, and change blindness (Driver, 1998).
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What sets it apart is simple: the missed stimulus is unforeseen, so it escapes the observer’s attention entirely.
The phenomenon was first documented in the 1970s.
Ulric Neisser, the father of cognitive psychology, and his colleagues discovered it while studying selective attention (Neisser, 1979; Neisser & Becklen, 1975).
In one study, participants watched two videos superimposed on the same screen, such as a basketball game and a hand-slapping game.
They monitored only one video.
When they focused on it, an unexpected event in the other video usually escaped their notice.
Researchers did not name the effect until 1992.
Irvin Rock and Arien Mack coined the term ‘inattentional blindness’ that year (Rock, Linnett, Grant & Mack, 1992; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Their book, Inattentional Blindness, detailed the phenomenon across a range of experimental procedures.
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Examples
The following are some instances of inattentional blindness.
The Invisible Gorilla: In a famous study, participants were asked to watch a video of people passing basketballs and count the number of passes made by one team. During the video, a person in a gorilla suit walked through the scene, but many participants completely missed seeing the gorilla because they were focused on counting the passes.
The Moonwalking Bear: In a similar study, participants watched a video of people passing a basketball and were asked to count the number of passes. Amid the video, a person dressed as a bear walked into the scene, waved, and then walked out. Surprisingly, many participants did not notice the bear because their attention was focused on counting the passes.
Cell Phone Distraction: A common example of inattentional blindness occurs when individuals are engrossed in using their cell phones while walking or driving. They may fail to notice other pedestrians, obstacles, or important visual cues in their surroundings due to their attention being focused on the phone screen.
Research Findings
Four landmark studies show how inattentional blindness works, from a controlled laboratory task to real-world distraction while walking.
The Static Cross Task
Mack and Rock’s static cross task gave researchers a tightly controlled way to measure the effect (Rock, Linnett, Grant & Mack, 1992; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Aim: To measure inattentional blindness with attention diverted from a known location and an unexpected object shown on a single surprise trial.
Method: Participants judged which arm of a briefly flashed cross (about 200 ms) was longer. On one critical trial an unexpected shape, coloured spot, or word also appeared, and observers were asked if they had noticed anything else.
Results: Roughly a quarter of observers failed to report the unexpected object. Objects at fixation were missed more often than peripheral ones, but an observer’s own name or a happy face broke through.
Conclusion: There is no conscious perception without attention: awareness tracks attention, not where the eyes point.
The method is rigorous, with a single surprise trial and a clean awareness probe. Its weakness is shared by the whole field. Noticing is judged by report a moment later, so a failure to report need not be a failure to perceive.
The breakthrough stimuli also complicate the strongest version of the claim. They show that some meaningful analysis of unattended input does occur.
The Invisible Gorilla Study
Aim: Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris (1999) tested whether people miss an unexpected, moving, and meaningful object when absorbed in a demanding visual task.
Method: 192 observers counted the basketball passes made by one of two teams (white or black shirts), in an easy or hard version. About 45 seconds in, a gorilla walked through the players and paused for the camera.
Results: Across conditions, 46% of observers failed to report the gorilla, though it was in plain view for several seconds. Noticing fell further when the task was harder and when the gorilla differed in colour from the team being counted.
Conclusion: People can miss a distinctive, meaningful, moving object for an extended period when attention is engaged elsewhere.
Salience alone does not explain who notices it. Noticing instead depends on task difficulty and on how closely the object matches what the observer is attending to.
The Red Cross Experiment
A related study asked participants to watch black and white shapes moving on a screen. They counted how often shapes of one colour bounced off the edges, while ignoring the other colour.
When a red cross crossed the screen, about a third of participants did not notice it (Most, Simons, Scholl, Jimenez, Clifford, & Chabris, 2001).
The pattern is not random.
It fits a broader theme: what people notice depends heavily on how closely an unexpected object resembles what they are already looking for.
An object that shares features with the ignored set is easy to miss, even when it is bright, moving, and directly in view.
This is why simply making a stimulus visually striking is not enough to guarantee it will be noticed.
Figure 1. Nearly one-third of participants in a study did not notice that a red cross passed on the screen because their attention was focused on the black or white figures. (credit: Cory Zanker)
The cross stayed on screen for 5 seconds. It was clearly distinguishable from the black and white shapes by both form and colour (see Fig. 1).
The finding suggests attention is tuned to specific perceptual dimensions. An unexpected stimulus that resembles the ignored set is more likely to be missed.
Most, Scholl, Clifford, and Simons (2005) tested this directly. Their paper was titled What You See Is What You Set. They varied the cross’s colour. It ran from the attended colour, through neutral grey, to the ignored colour.
When the cross matched the attended colour, the large majority of observers noticed it. When it matched the ignored colour, most remained blind, even though the cross was physically conspicuous. Grey crosses were noticed at intermediate rates.
Awareness therefore depends on the observer’s attentional set: the collection of features, such as colour, shape or location, that the current task prioritises.
Physical salience matters only when it aligns with that set.
Divided Attention While Walking
A further study examined divided attention during an everyday task: walking (Hyman, Boss, Wise, McKenzie, & Caggiano, 2010).
Pedestrians crossing a plaza were grouped by what else they were doing at the same time.
Some listened to an MP3 player, some talked on the phone, some walked with a companion, and some carried no device at all.
The unexpected stimulus was a unicycling clown in vivid dress.
Phone users noticed the clown least often of all four groups.
Talking on a phone narrows attention more than the other activities tested, even during a simple task like walking.
It is the same mechanism seen in the laboratory studies above.
A demanding second task raises the effective mental workload.
That leaves less spare attention for anything unexpected, even something as visible as a person on a unicycle.
Why It Occurs
Because attention is limited, the brain devotes its processing resources to what is currently task-relevant, and only attended information becomes a reportable conscious percept (Mack, 2003).
When an unexpected stimulus enters our line of sight, we may fail to process it consciously. The explanations below show how.
Conspicuity
Conspicuity theory holds that a stimulus is noticed only if it is conspicuous in one of two ways. It may be sensorially conspicuous (physically salient through brightness or contrast) or cognitively conspicuous (personally familiar or meaningful). Anything that fits neither category can be missed (Mack, 2003).
A gorilla in a basketball game is rare. That rarity is why people miss it.
While busy tracking passes, a viewer has no cognitive category ready for a gorilla, so the costume fails to register as conspicuous.
Either kind of conspicuity can fail. An object that is visible but not visually prominent tends to go unnoticed. A visually striking object can also be missed if it has no relevance to what the observer cares about.
Mental Workload
Mental workload theory holds that focusing heavily on one stimulus uses up cognitive resources. There is then nothing left over to process a second stimulus at the same time (Mack, 2003).
Attentional capacity varies from one situation to the next, which changes how well someone can track multiple things at once.
Driving illustrates this well. A driver deep in a phone conversation devotes less attention to the road, so a deer stepping into view may go unnoticed.
The reverse also holds. When mental workload is low, people are more likely to notice something unexpected.
Working Memory
Working memory capacity was once thought to matter. Seegmiller, Watson, and Strayer (2011) first measured participants’ working memory capacity with complex-span tasks. These combine remembering items with another demanding task. They then had participants watch the same gorilla video used by Simons and Chabris.
Among participants who counted the passes accurately, those with lower working memory capacity noticed the gorilla less often (36%) than those with higher capacity (67%). The authors argued that stronger attentional control frees up spare capacity to catch the unexpected.
Later, larger studies have not confirmed this link. Simons and Jensen (2009) found that once task performance was equated across participants, cognitive ability no longer predicted who noticed.
Kreitz, Furley, Memmert, and Simons (2015) tested several tasks and found working memory capacity carried almost no predictive weight. Whether a given person notices a given unexpected object now looks largely down to chance, not stable ability.
Perceptual Load Theory
Nilli Lavie’s perceptual load theory is the most developed account of why a demanding task produces blindness (Lavie, 1995, 2005). It holds that selective attention has a fixed capacity, which the current task claims automatically and completely.
How much attention is left over depends on the load:
High perceptual load: many items or fine discriminations use up all capacity. Nothing spills over onto unexpected material, so it goes unprocessed and unnoticed.
Low perceptual load: spare capacity overflows onto other stimuli. Unexpected objects then reach awareness more easily.
The theory therefore predicts that blindness rises with the perceptual load of the main task. Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) confirmed this.
A harder discrimination in an otherwise identical display sharply raised the rate at which an unexpected object was missed. Load, not the mere presence of a task, drove the effect.
The same logic explains why the hard counting task in the gorilla study produced more blindness than the easy one (Simons & Chabris, 1999).
Implications
While the results of inattentional blindness in research experiments may sound benign or even humorous, its implications in real-life can be tragically devastating.
Automobiles
Research shows that focusing on a particular object may result in inattentional blindness (Simons, 2000). This means that when someone texts or talks while driving, their primary focus may drift off the roadway.
This may result in a failure to notice objects on the road, such as stop signs, speed limit indicators, or even other cars. The cost can be severe. Inattentional blindness can lead to accidents and even death.
Aviation
A heads-up display (HUD) utilized in aviation may induce inattentional blindness (Green 2002).
HUD projects information onto a helmet-mounted screen or the windshield while simultaneously enabling pilots to keep looking ahead through the windshield.
Simulator studies have shown, however, that HUD may lead to incursion accidents on the runway. The display can backfire.
Attention becomes tuned to the symbols projected on the display. Unexpected real-world objects, such as an aircraft or vehicle on the runway, can then be missed even when looked at.
Chen et al. (2023) found a driving analogue. With an augmented-reality head-up display, drivers showed more inattentional blindness to unexpected hazards, and the rate depended on where the hazard sat relative to the projected graphics.
Given the increasing prevalence of HUD in tanks and automobiles, the discovery has serious implications even outside aviation.
Law Enforcement
A study of inattentional blindness among police officers found that even trained officers can fail to notice a firearm in plain sight (Simons & Schlosser, 2017).
During a simulated traffic stop, a gun was placed in full view on a stopped vehicle’s dashboard.
The stop was scripted but realistic.
Police academy trainees and experienced officers both took part, and many missed the gun:
Trainees (100): 58% failed to notice the gun.
Experienced officers (75): 33% failed to notice the gun.
Whether the driver acted cooperative or hostile made almost no difference to noticing.
The pattern held either way.
Missing a weapon in plain sight, even when primed to watch for threats, shows how task focus can override safety-critical information and put officers at risk.
The result converges with a broader pattern: a 2022 meta-analysis found that expertise offers little protection against inattentional blindness in general (Ekelund, Fernsund, Karlsson & Mac Giolla, 2022).
So training alone cannot be relied on to prevent this kind of miss.
The finding also matters for eyewitness testimony. A witness absorbed in one part of an event may genuinely fail to perceive another, so an honest ‘I didn’t see it’ does not mean the object was absent.
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Sport
Team sports show the same effect. A player must track the tactical picture while still spotting an unexpected opportunity.
Memmert and Furley (2007) filmed handball situations from a specific player’s viewpoint. Participants judged the opponent’s stance and chose how to attack.
On a critical trial, an unmarked teammate stood in full view beside that opponent. Half of participants failed to notice him. Passing to him was the clearest route to scoring.
Detection fell further when participants first received extra tactical instructions, which narrowed their attentional set. It rose sharply when the unmarked player waved.
Expertise helps only within its own domain. Basketball players notice an unexpected object during play in their own sport more often than novices do (Memmert, 2006).
Yet team athletes, individual-sport athletes, and non-athletes did not differ in noticing an unexpected object in a neutral, non-sporting task (Memmert, Simons, & Grimme, 2009). The benefit looks like a sharpened, sport-specific attentional set, not a general perceptual gift.
Medicine
Radiology provides one of the most striking professional examples.
Drew, Võ, and Wolfe (2013) asked 24 radiologists to search chest CT scans for lung nodules.
Into the final scan, they inserted an image of a gorilla, 48 times the size of an average nodule.
Eighty-three percent of the radiologists missed the gorilla.
Eye-tracking showed that most of them had looked directly at its location without ever consciously registering it.
Years of training did not help.
If anything, a strong, narrow attentional set may have filtered out the much larger, unrelated shape entirely. An attentional set is the collection of features that the current task prioritises. These radiologists were set for small, nodule-shaped abnormalities.
A 2024 review of inattentional blindness in medicine found similar patterns across missed X-ray findings and overlooked secondary diagnoses.
It cautions, however, that not every clinical error can be cleanly attributed to this one mechanism (Hults et al., 2024).
Change Blindness vs. Inattentional Blindness
Change blindness and inattentional blindness are often confused, but they are distinct failures of visual awareness.
Inattentional blindness: failing to notice a fully visible, unexpected object because attention is engaged elsewhere. The observer never becomes aware it was there.
Change blindness: failing to notice a change between two scenes when the change happens during a brief disruption, like a blink or a film cut. The observer misses the alteration itself.
The two phenomena are related.
Both show that people represent far less of a visual scene in detail than they assume.
But they are not the same.
Inattentional blindness involves one continuous display and a wholly new object that is missed.
Change blindness involves a transition between two displays and a difference that is missed.
The Attentional Blink
The attentional blink is a second phenomenon often confused with inattentional blindness. Two targets appear in a rapid stream of briefly shown items. If the second follows the first by roughly 200 to 500 milliseconds, people struggle to report it (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992).
The resemblance is superficial. Inattentional blindness involves a single, wholly unexpected object competing with a demanding task for limited attention. In the blink, two expected targets compete across a brief interval, and processing the first temporarily consumes the resources needed to consolidate the second into awareness.
The blink is a temporal, target-driven bottleneck. Inattentional blindness is a spatial, expectation-driven failure. Both show attention is a limited resource.
Evidence Check: Does the Research Hold Up?
Verdict: Supported with qualifications.
The core finding is secure. A visible but unexpected object often goes unnoticed when attention is committed elsewhere. How often depends on the perceptual demands of the task and on what the observer is set to look for. Independent groups have reproduced this.
What is not secure is the explanation of what happens to the unnoticed object. The evidence that it is processed implicitly weakened when the same literature was re-analysed for publication bias. Publication bias is the tendency for striking results to be published more often than null ones.
Perceptual Load and Attentional Set
Level of evidence: Meta-analysis or systematic review; independently replicated.
The claim is that inattentional blindness is graded. It rises with the perceptual load of the main task. It falls when the unexpected object matches the features the observer is set to look for. Attention, not physical salience, gates awareness.
Three pieces of evidence bear on it:
Meta-analysis: Matias, Belletier, Izaute, Lutz, and Silvert (2021) ran a systematic review with three meta-analyses of studies that manipulated perceptual or cognitive resources.
Classic experiments: Most, Scholl, Clifford, and Simons (2005) showed that noticing followed similarity to the attended colour rather than raw conspicuousness.
Independent replication: Wallisch, Mackey, Karlovich, and Heeger (2023), a team with no tie to the original authors, ran three high-powered online experiments (total n = 4,493).
The meta-analysis found that blindness increased significantly with perceptual load, as load theory predicts. The cognitive-load prediction was not clearly supported. The interaction of the two remains understudied.
Wallisch and colleagues described their design as a conceptual replication of Simons and Chabris (1999) and Most et al. (2005).
Counting dots of one colour made an unexpected moving object much easier to detect than counting the other colour.
Fast objects, though not slow ones, were readily noticed. The authors attribute this to speed overriding task focus, not physical salience.
In their third experiment at the fastest speed, 73% noticed an object of the attended colour against 48% for the ignored colour. Set still mattered, even when speed raised noticing overall.
Together, these results support the claim that blindness is a lawful, graded modulation rather than a fixed trait.
Set matters, but speed is a separate cue. The cognitive-load arm should be stated more cautiously than the perceptual-load arm.
How far can this evidence be trusted? The meta-analysis tests the load claim directly. It mixes very different paradigms, though, so the pooled estimate averages across heterogeneous tasks. The classic experiments used modest laboratory samples and abstract shapes.
The Wallisch work is much larger and independent, which makes it the most trustworthy evidence for attentional set. It was run online, where viewing conditions are uncontrolled, and preregistration is not reported.
Is the Missed Object Processed?
Level of evidence: Meta-analysis or systematic review; replications conflict.
The claim is that unattended objects may register at low levels, and sometimes semantically, without ever becoming conscious. Meta-analytic evidence points both ways.
Re-analysis of 16 datasets: Kreitz, Pugnaghi, and Memmert (2020) found that participants who did not notice the critical object still guessed its features at a rate significantly above chance.
Meta-analysis of 59 experiments: Nobre, de Melo, Gauer, and Wagemans (2020) reached a similar conclusion, but cautioned that the estimate depends on how awareness is measured.
Bias correction: Nobre, de Melo, and Shanks (2022) bias-corrected the same studies and found strong signs of publication bias. Corrected, the data were consistent with no reliable implicit effect.
The claim that unnoticed stimuli are processed without awareness is plausible but unproven. The bias-corrected analysis does not show that the effect is absent. It shows that the apparent support was not robust to the correction. That is a verdict of not secure, not refuted.
The 2022 analysis is the most trustworthy piece of evidence. It alone tests whether the positive result could be an artefact of which studies get published.
Its limit is that bias-correction methods cannot prove an effect is absent. The 2020 syntheses rely on guesses measured after the event, from forced-choice questions. Above-chance guessing may reflect weak awareness rather than none.
No preregistered rerun of the guessing result is on record. Only new experiments with an objective awareness measure could settle the question.
Critical Evaluation
Inattentional blindness is one of the best-established phenomena in cognitive psychology, but it also has real limits worth weighing.
Four points matter most:
Well-Replicated: the effect holds up across labs, tasks, and real-world settings, from driving and policing to radiology.
Graded, Not Fixed: how often it happens shifts with task difficulty and attentional set, so it is not a stable trait.
Individual Differences Story Fell Apart: early evidence linking cognitive ability to noticing largely failed to replicate.
The Unseen Object’s Fate Is Contested: whether missed objects are processed at all is still an open, actively studied question.
Well-Replicated Across Settings
Inattentional blindness is one of the most reliably replicated effects in cognitive psychology.
It holds up on three fronts:
Across tasks: it shows up in static and dynamic laboratory tasks.
Across labs: many independent labs have reproduced it, not just the original gorilla video.
Across settings: drivers, police officers, and radiologists have all shown the same pattern in realistic settings.
That argues against dismissing the lab effect as a staged artefact.
Theoretically, the effect has been productive as well.
It forced psychologists to abandon the assumption that a salient object automatically grabs attention.
It also built strong evidence for capacity-limited models of perception.
The field has matured toward meta-analysis and pre-registered replication, the same rigor now standard across psychology.
That kind of rigor is rare for a forty-year-old finding.
Graded, Not All-or-Nothing
How often inattentional blindness occurs is not fixed.
It rises with the perceptual demands of the primary task.
It falls when the unexpected object matches what the observer is already looking for.
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) showed this directly.
Making a perceptual discrimination task harder sharply increased how often people missed an unexpected object, even though nothing else about the display changed.
The load itself, not simply the presence of a second task, was what drove the change.
The effect can swing from near zero to more than 80% depending on task difficulty and on how closely the object matches the attended features (Simons & Chabris, 1999).
That is a huge range for one phenomenon.
Because of that range, popular claims that people are simply blind to half of what is in front of them overstate the truth.
The real rate depends heavily on the conditions of the test.
The Individual-Differences Story Has Not Held Up
An early study suggested that working memory capacity matters.
People with higher working memory capacity noticed the gorilla far more often than those with lower capacity (Seegmiller, Watson & Strayer, 2011).
The authors argued that better attentional control protects against the effect.
Later, larger, and better-powered studies have not confirmed this.
Simons and Jensen (2009) found that once task performance was equated across participants, individual differences in ability no longer predicted who noticed the unexpected object.
Kreitz, Furley, Memmert, and Simons (2015) tested multiple tasks.
They found that working memory capacity and attention breadth carried almost no predictive weight.
A 2022 meta-analysis pooled 14 studies and over 1,000 participants.
It found only a small, non-significant advantage for domain experts over novices (Ekelund, Fernsund, Karlsson & Mac Giolla, 2022).
This reinforces the same conclusion.
Who notices a given unexpected object looks largely down to chance, not stable traits.
Whether Missed Objects Are Processed At All Remains Contested
Two 2020 meta-analyses looked at what happens to objects people miss.
Both concluded that the missed objects are still processed at some level.
Non-noticers could guess features of the object above chance (Kreitz, Pugnaghi, & Memmert, 2020).
But a 2022 re-analysis challenged this.
It used tools designed to detect publication bias. That is the tendency for striking results to be published more often than unremarkable ones. The tools were applied to the same data.
The apparent effect turned out to be largely an artefact of which studies got published (Nobre, de Melo & Shanks, 2022).
Once corrected for that bias, the evidence for any real implicit processing became far weaker.
The debate is not just about the finding itself.
It is a reminder that a result can survive one meta-analysis.
It can then be substantially undercut by a bias-corrected re-analysis of the very same literature.
Evidence quality, not vote-counting, should decide the matter.
A separate question is whether people see the object and then forget it. Wolfe (1999) called this inattentional amnesia: the object is consciously seen but never encoded into memory, so it cannot be reported moments later.
Ward and Scholl (2015) tested this with repeated trials. If observers saw and then forgot, earlier exposure should ease later noticing. Instead, failures of awareness recurred in a pattern more consistent with a failure of perception than of memory.
A single design cannot close a debate this fundamental. Still, the evidence currently favours a perceptual locus.
Contemporary Research
The most rigorous recent test of whether expertise protects against inattentional blindness comes from a 2022 meta-analysis.
The stakes are practical: many jobs assume experience helps.
Aim: Ekelund, Fernsund, Karlsson, and Mac Giolla (2022) asked whether being an expert at a task reduces inattentional blindness.
Method: The team pooled 14 studies covering 1,153 participants who compared noticing rates between experts and novices. They also tested whether the stimulus’s relevance to the expert’s own field made any difference.
Results: The reduction was small and not significant. 56% of experts experienced it, against 62% of novices, and domain relevance made no reliable difference.
Conclusion: The evidence gives little support to the idea that expertise reliably protects people from missing an unexpected event.
The small number of studies does leave real uncertainty around this result.
That caveat matters.
A related systematic review reached a complementary conclusion about perceptual load.
Matias, Belletier, Izaute, Lutz, and Silvert (2021) confirmed across three meta-analyses that inattentional blindness rises with perceptual load.
The evidence for a separate effect of cognitive load, however, was much weaker.
Attentional set remains the most reliable determinant of noticing. Liu, Griffith, Davies, and Aimola Davies (2023) pitted task instructions against visual distinctiveness across seven experiments.
Observers set their attention to whichever dimension, colour or shape, most efficiently separated relevant from irrelevant objects. They then noticed unexpected objects that matched that dimension. The set is not fixed by instruction alone: it adapts to make the task easy.
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BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester
Chartered Psychologist (CPsychol)
Saul McLeod, PhD, is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.