The mind and body problem concerns the extent to which the mind and the body are separate or the same thing.
The mind is about mental processes, thoughts, and consciousness. The body is about the physical aspects of the brain-neurons and how the brain is structured.
Is the mind part of the body, or the body part of the mind? If they are distinct, then how do they interact? And which of the two is in charge?
Many theories have been put forward to explain the relationship between what we call your mind (defined as the conscious thinking “you,” which experiences your thoughts) and your brain (i.e., part of your body).
What is Monism?
This view asserts that there is only one fundamental substance (physical or mental).
There are two basic types of monism:
1. Materialism (or Physicalism)
Materialism asserts that everything in the universe is ultimately physical or material, including the mind.
Mental states, consciousness, and everything we associate with the mind are seen as arising from or reducible to physical processes in the brain.
Materialism is the belief that nothing exists apart from the material world (i.e., physical matter like the brain); materialist psychologists generally agree that consciousness (the mind) is the function of the brain.
Thomas Hobbes (17th c. philosopher who held that everything that exists is body or matter.
All reality (including the mind) is physical. Mental states are brain states or are caused by physical processes.
Materialism denies any immaterial mind or soul separate from the body.
Mental processes can be identified with purely physical processes in the central nervous system, and human beings are just complicated physiological organisms, no more than that.
For example, reductive materialism posits mental phenomena can be reduced to or identified with physical processes (e.g. the experience of pain just is certain neural firings).
Eliminative materialism claims that our common concepts of mind (beliefs, desires, etc.) are flawed and will eventually be eliminated in favor of neuroscientific explanations.
In short, materialists argue the mind just is what the brain does.
2. Idealism
This is a less common form of monism.
This view holds that reality is fundamentally mental or spiritual.
The physical world, in this view, is either a construct of the mind or somehow less real than the mental realm.
Reality, as we perceive it, is fundamentally mental or mind-dependent. This means that what we consider the “external world” is, in some way, a product of our minds or consciousness.
Idealism has profound implications for our understanding of:
- Perception: How our minds construct our experience of reality.
- Reality: The very nature of what is “real.”
- Consciousness: The central role of consciousness in shaping our world.
Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism (also called Subjective Idealism) believes that physical objects and events are reducible to mental objects, properties, and events.
Ultimately, only mental objects (i.e., the mind) exist. Bishop Berkeley claimed that what we think of as our body is merely the perception of the mind. Before you reject this too rapidly, consider the results of a recent study.
Scientists asked three hemiplegics (i.e., loss of movement from one side of the body) stroke victims with damage to the right hemispheres of their brains about their abilities to move their arms.
All three claimed, despite evidence to the contrary in the mirror in front of them, that they could move their right and left hands equally well.
Further, two of the three stroke victims claimed that an experimental stooge who faked paralysis (i.e., lack of movement) of his left arm was able to move his arm satisfactorily.
Objective Idealism
This view suggests that there is an objective, universal mind or consciousness that underlies reality.
Individual minds are seen as manifestations of this larger, cosmic mind.
Implications of Monism
- Mind-Body Relationship: Monism, particularly materialism, suggests a close relationship between mind and brain. Mental states are seen as dependent on or identical to brain states.
- Scientific Approach: Materialism aligns well with the scientific worldview, as it allows for the study of the mind through the investigation of physical processes in the brain.
- Parsimony: Materialism offers a simpler and more parsimonious explanation of reality compared to dualism.
- Evidence: Studies using techniques like fMRI and EEG show specific brain regions activating during particular thoughts, emotions, and experiences.
- Challenges: Some philosophers argue that monism, especially materialism, struggles to account for subjective experience (qualia) and the unique nature of consciousness.
What is Dualism?
Dualism, in the context of the mind-body problem, is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical.
A prominent dualist view is that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different categories of entities or properties. This position is known as substance dualism.
The most famous example of substance dualism is Cartesian dualism, named after René Descartes, who argued that the mind is a non-physical substance, distinct from the physical substance of the body.
Substance dualism contrasts with monism, which holds that there is only one fundamental kind of substance.
Another form of dualism is property dualism, which holds that mental properties are distinct from and not reducible to physical properties, even if there is only one kind of substance.
Property dualism avoids the problem of explaining how two different substances can interact, but it faces the challenge of explaining how mental properties can have causal efficacy in a world that is fundamentally physical.
Implications of Dualism
Dualism has been influential in the history of philosophy and religion, but it has also been challenged by many philosophers and scientists who argue that it is incompatible with a scientific worldview.
One of the main challenges to dualism is the problem of mental causation, which is the problem of explaining how mental events can cause physical events if the mental and physical are fundamentally different.
Despite these challenges, dualism continues to be a popular view, and it has been defended by many contemporary philosophers.
Some of the main arguments for dualism include the argument from qualia, which is the argument that subjective experiences cannot be reduced to physical properties, and the argument from intentionality, which is the argument that mental states are about something, while physical states are not.
Subjective Experience (Qualia)
- Dualists emphasize the unique and irreducible nature of subjective experiences, often referred to as qualia.
- Qualia are the qualitative aspects of consciousness, such as the redness of red, the feeling of pain, or the taste of chocolate.
- Dualists argue that these subjective experiences cannot be fully captured or explained by purely physical descriptions of brain states.
- They contend that qualia possess a distinctly mental quality that resists reduction to physical properties.
Intentionality
- Intentionality is the “aboutness” of mental states, their ability to represent or be directed at something beyond themselves.
- Dualists point out that mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, have this representational quality, while physical states do not.
- They argue that intentionality is a unique feature of the mental and cannot be explained in purely physical terms.
Interactionism
Interactionism posits that the mind and body are distinct substances (as in dualism), but they causally interact with one another.
It recognizes that mental states, such as thoughts, emotions, and consciousness, possess qualities that are fundamentally different from the physical properties of matter, such as size, shape, and motion. Yet, it also asserts that these two realms are not isolated but rather intertwined in a causal relationship.
This means that mental events can cause physical events, and physical events can cause mental events.
The mind is non-physical, but it influences the physical brain/body (and receives input from it).
A major challenge for interactionism is the interaction problem.
How can two fundamentally different substances, one physical and one non-physical, causally interact? This has been a source of much philosophical debate.
In the 20th century, Karl Poppere & neurophysiologist John Eccles argued for dualistic interactionism (in The Self and Its Brain, 1977), positing that the mind interacts with brain physiology.
René Descartes is the most famous proponent of interactionist dualism.
Descartes believed that the mind and body are distinct substances that can causally interact (Cartesian interaction).
He argued that the mind (a non-physical “thinking substance”) and the body (a physical “extended substance”) interact, with this interaction occurring at the pineal gland in the brain.
Critical Evaluation
Intuitive Appeal and Everyday Experience
- Interactionism aligns with our common-sense intuition that our thoughts, feelings, and intentions can influence our actions and that our physical experiences can affect our mental states.
- We experience this interaction daily: a desire (mental) leads to reaching for a glass of water (physical), or a stubbed toe (physical) causes pain (mental).
- This intuitive appeal and alignment with everyday experience provide a degree of support for interactionism.
Placebo Effect and Psychoneuroimmunology
- The placebo effect, where a person’s belief in a treatment can lead to real physiological changes, provides evidence for the mind’s influence on the body.
- Psychoneuroimmunology studies how psychological factors, such as stress and emotions, can affect the immune system, demonstrating a clear interaction between mental states and physical health.
- These findings support the notion that mental events can have tangible effects on the physical body.
Phenomenology and the First-Person Perspective
- Phenomenology, a philosophical approach that focuses on subjective experience, emphasizes the unique and irreducible nature of consciousness.
- From a first-person perspective, it seems undeniable that our thoughts and feelings play a role in shaping our actions and experiences in the world.
- While not empirical evidence in the traditional sense, the phenomenological perspective lends support to the idea that mental states have causal efficacy in the physical world.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness
- The “hard problem of consciousness,” as defined by philosopher David Chalmers, highlights the difficulty of explaining how subjective experience arises from physical processes.
- Some philosophers argue that the inability of purely physicalist explanations to fully account for consciousness leaves room for interactionist perspectives.
- They suggest that the unique qualities of consciousness may require a distinct mental entity that interacts with the physical brain.
Psychology & the Mind-Body Debate
The mind-body problem has significant implications for understanding:
-
- Consciousness: How does subjective experience arise from physical brain processes?
- Mental illness: How do psychological factors influence physical health, and vice versa?
- Neuroscience: How do brain structures and functions relate to mental processes?
- Psychotherapy: How do mental processes effect behaviors, and how can changing mental processes effect behaviors.
The different approaches to psychology take contrasting views of whether the mind and body are separate or related.
Thinking (having freedom of choice) is a mental event, yet it can cause behavior to occur (muscles move in response to a thought). Thinking can therefore be said to make things happen, “mind moves matter.”
Behaviorists believe that psychology should only be concerned with “observable actions,” namely stimulus and response.
They believe that thought processes such as the mind cannot be studied scientifically and objectively and should therefore be ignored. Radical behaviorists believe that the mind does not even exist.
The biologists who argue that the mind does not exist because there is no physical structure called the mind also follow this approach. Biologists argue that the brain will ultimately be found to be the mind. The brain, with its structures, cells, and neural connections, will, with scientific research, eventually identify the mind.
Since both behaviorists and biologists believe that only one type of reality exists, those that we can see, feel and touch, their approach is known as monism. Monism is the belief that, ultimately, the mind and the brain are the same thing. The behaviorist and biological approaches believe in materialism and monism.
However, biologists and behaviorists cannot account for the phenomenon of hypnosis. Hilgard and Orne have studied this. They placed participants in a hypnotic trance and, through unconscious hypnotic suggestion, told the participants they would be touched with a “red hot” piece of metal when they were actually touched with a pencil.
The participants in a deep trance had a skin reaction (water blisters) just as if they had been touched with burning metal. This is an example of the mind controlling the body’s reaction. Similar results have been found in patients given hypnosis to control pain.
This contradicts the monism approach, as the body should not react to unconscious suggestions in this way. This study supports the idea of dualism, the view that the mind and body function separately.
In the same way, humanists like Carl Rogers would also dispute materialism monism.
They believe that subjective experiences are the only way to study human behavior. Humanists do not deny the real world exists rather they believe it is each person’s unique subjective approach to defining reality that is important.
In the area of mental illness, a Schizophrenic might not define their actions as ill; rather, they would believe they had insight into some occurrence that no one else had. This is why humanists believe the study of how each person views themselves is essential.
However, the problem of the relationship between consciousness and reality from a subjective view has problems. The paranoid schizophrenic who believes the postal service “are agents for the government and trying to kill him” is still mentally ill and needs treatment if they are not to be a danger to themselves or the public.
Recent research from cognitive psychologists has placed a new emphasis on this debate. They have taken the computer analogy of Artificial Intelligence and applied it to this debate. They argue that the brain can be compared to computer hardware that is “wired” or connected to the human body.
The mind is, therefore, like software, allowing a variety of different software programs: to run. This can account for the different reactions people have to the same stimulus. This idea ties in with cognitive mediational (thinking) processes.
In computer analogies, we have a new version of dualism that allows us to incorporate modern terms such as computers and software instead of Descartes’s “I think therefore I am.”
Contemporary psychology and neuroscience tend to favor monistic views, particularly materialism, emphasizing the brain’s role in mental processes.
Contemporary Debates
Modern perspectives on the mind-body link:
Cognitive Neuroscience
Uses brain imaging and neuroscience to study how mental processes relate to brain activity.
It provides evidence of tight mind-brain correlations (specific thoughts, emotions, or behaviors correspond to activity in specific brain regions) and seeks the neural basis of consciousness.
In essence, cognitive neuroscience aims to explain mental operations via the brain’s information-processing architecture, bridging the gap between mind and body through empirical research.
Embodied Cognition
The view that the mind is not an isolated “brain in a vat” but is shaped by the body’s interactions with the environment. Cognitive processes depend on the body’s movement, perception, and context.
Thus, thinking is embodied – the brain alone is not the whole story.
This challenges traditional cognitive theory and mind-body dualism by arguing that an organism’s bodily experience is fundamental to its mental life (for example, physical gestures can influence problem-solving, suggesting cognition is grounded in action).
Panpsychism & Integrated Information Theory
These emerging views consider consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality.
Panpsychism posits that consciousness is a basic feature of the universe, present even in elementary particles (in a very rudimentary form) – in other words, mind-like quality pervades all matter
Integrated Information Theory (IIT), proposed by Giulio Tononi, suggests that consciousness corresponds to the degree of integrated information in a system.
It treats consciousness as an intrinsic property of certain organized networks: if a system (brain or even a circuit) integrates information above a threshold, it has some level of experience
These theories, while controversial, offer alternative solutions to the mind-body problem by suggesting that consciousness is not an emergent fluke of brains but an inherent property of physical systems under certain conditions.
Sources
- Bedau, M. (1986). Cartesian Interaction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10, 483-502.
- Chalmers, D. (2015). Panpsychism and panprotopsychism. Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism, 246(2003), 102-154.
- Descartes, R. (1984). The philosophical writings of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press.
- Fodor, J. A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific american, 244(1), 114-123.
- Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, pp. 127–36.(1986). What Mary didn’t know, Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291-95.
- Ludwig, K. (1992). Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference.
- Ludwig, K. (2003). The mind-body problem: An overview.
- McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the Mind–Body problem?. Mind, 98(391), 349-366.
- McGinn, C. (1999). The mysterious flame (Vol. 121). New York: Basic Books.
- Popper, K. R., Eccles, J. C., Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The self-conscious mind and the brain. The self and its brain, 355-376.
- Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC neuroscience, 5, 1-22.